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The science of the mind

  • 1 Mind

       It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)
       Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)
       The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)
       MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)
       [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)
       Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)
       7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses
       Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....
       Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.
       In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.
       The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)
       Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.
    ... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind

  • 2 mind

    1. noun

    bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

    have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

    bring something to mind — etwas in Erinnerung rufen

    it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

    put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

    2) (opinion)

    in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

    be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

    be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

    change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern

    I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

    make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

    make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

    3) (direction of thoughts)

    his mind is on other things — er ist mit den Gedanken woanders

    give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

    I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

    something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

    close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

    4) (way of thinking and feeling) Denkweise, die

    frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

    state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

    be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

    5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

    in one's mind — im stillen

    in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

    nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

    6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

    have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

    great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

    7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

    lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

    2. transitive verb
    1) (heed)

    don't mind what he says — gib nichts auf sein Gerede

    let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

    2) (concern oneself about)

    he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

    I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

    never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

    never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

    don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

    mind the doors! — Vorsicht an den Türen!

    3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

    did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

    would you mind opening the door? — würdest du bitte die Tür öffnen?

    do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

    4) (remember and take care)

    mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

    mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

    mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

    5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

    mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)

    3. intransitive verb
    1)

    mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

    2) usu. in imper. (take note)

    follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

    I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

    3) (care, object)

    do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

    he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

    4) (give heed)

    never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

    never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

    Phrasal Verbs:
    - academic.ru/89159/mind_out">mind out
    * * *
    1.
    (the power by which one thinks etc; the intelligence or understanding: The child already has the mind of an adult.) der Verstand
    2. verb
    1) (to look after or supervise (eg a child): mind the baby.) aufpassen
    2) (to be upset by; to object to: You must try not to mind when he criticizes your work.) sich etwas machen aus
    3) (to be careful of: Mind (= be careful not to trip over) the step!) sich in Acht nehmen
    4) (to pay attention to or obey: You should mind your parents' words/advice.) beachten
    3. interjection
    (be careful!: Mind! There's a car coming!) Achtung!
    - -minded
    - mindful
    - mindless
    - mindlessly
    - mindlessness
    - mindreader
    - at/in the back of one's mind
    - change one's mind
    - be out of one's mind
    - do you mind! - have a good mind to
    - have half a mind to
    - have a mind to
    - in one's mind's eye
    - in one's right mind
    - keep one's mind on
    - know one's own mind
    - make up one's mind
    - mind one's own business
    - never mind
    - on one's mind
    - put someone in mind of
    - put in mind of
    - speak one's mind
    - take/keep one's mind off
    - to my mind
    * * *
    [maɪnd]
    I. n
    1. (brain, intellect) Geist m, Verstand m
    she's one of the greatest \minds of today sie ist einer der größten Köpfe unserer Zeit
    it's a question of \mind over matter das ist eine reine Willensfrage
    he's got the \mind of a four-year-old! er hat den Verstand eines Vierjährigen!
    it was a triumph of \mind over matter hier war der Wille stärker
    in one's \mind eyes vor seinem geistigen Auge
    frame of \mind seelische Verfassung
    a fine \mind ein großer Geist
    to have a good \mind einen klaren Verstand haben
    to have a logical \mind logisch denken können
    to the Victorian \mind nach der viktorianischen Denkweise
    to use one's \mind seinen Verstand gebrauchen
    2. (sanity) Verstand m
    to be in one's right \mind noch ganz richtig im Kopf sein
    to be out of one's \mind den Verstand verloren haben
    to drive sb out of his/her \mind jdn wahnsinnig machen
    to lose [or go out of] one's \mind den Verstand verlieren
    3. (thoughts) Gedanken pl
    the idea never entered my \mind auf diesen Gedanken wäre ich gar nicht gekommen
    it went out of my \mind ich hab's vergessen
    you put that out of your \mind! das kannst du dir aus dem Kopf schlagen!
    I can't get that song out of my \mind das Lied will mir einfach nicht mehr aus dem Kopf gehen!
    sorry, my \mind is on other things tut mir leid, ich bin mit den Gedanken ganz woanders
    to be on one's \mind einen beschäftigen
    you're always on my \mind ich denke die ganze Zeit an dich
    what's on your \mind? woran denkst du?
    what's on your \mind! woran du nur wieder denkst!
    to be in the back of sb's \mind in jds Hinterkopf sein
    to bear [or keep] sth in \mind etw nicht vergessen
    bearing in \mind that... angesichts der Tatsache, dass...
    to bring [or call] sth to \mind (remember) sich akk etw in Erinnerung rufen; (remind) an etw akk erinnern
    to come [or spring] to sb's \mind jdm einfallen
    to have sb/sth in \mind an jdn/etw denken
    did you have anything special in \mind? dachten Sie an etwas Bestimmtes?
    to have a lot of things on one's \mind viele Sorgen haben
    to keep one's \mind on sth one's work sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren
    sth puts sb in \mind of sth esp BRIT etw erinnert jdn an etw akk
    to put sb out of one's \mind jdn aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen
    to read sb's \mind jds Gedanken lesen
    to set one's \mind to do sth sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren
    to take sb's \mind off sth jdn auf andere Gedanken bringen [o von etw dat ablenken
    nothing could be further from my \mind than... nichts läge mir ferner als...
    to have in \mind to do sth vorhaben, etw zu tun
    to know one's [own] \mind wissen, was man will
    to make up one's \mind sich akk entscheiden
    my \mind is made up! ich habe einen Entschluss gefasst!
    to set one's \mind on sth sich dat etw in den Kopf setzen
    5. usu sing (opinion) Meinung f, Ansicht f
    to my \mind... meiner Meinung nach...
    to give sb a piece of one's \mind jdm seine Meinung sagen
    to be of the same \mind der gleichen Meinung [o derselben Ansicht] sein
    I'm of the same \mind as you ich bin deiner Meinung
    to be in [or of] two \minds about sth sich dat über etw akk nicht im Klaren sein
    to change one's \mind es sich dat anders überlegen
    to have a \mind of one's own seinen eigenen Kopf haben
    to have half a [good] \mind to... gute Lust haben,...
    to be of a \mind to do sth ( form) geneigt sein, etw zu tun
    7.
    ▶ to be bored out of one's \mind sich akk zu Tode langweilen
    ▶ great \minds think alike ah, ich sehe, wir verstehen uns!
    II. vt
    ▪ to \mind sth auf etw akk aufpassen
    \mind your head [or that you don't bang your head] pass auf, dass du dir nicht den Kopf stößt
    \mind your head Vorsicht mit dem Kopf!
    here, \mind, he said when she trod on his foot passen Sie doch auf, sagte er, als sie ihm auf den Fuß trat
    \mind the step! Vorsicht Stufe!
    \mind how you go pass doch auf!; (as farewell) pass auf dich auf!
    \mind your language! ( dated) pass auf, was du sagst!
    2. (care about)
    ▪ to \mind sb sich akk um jdn kümmern
    don't \mind me kümmer dich nicht um mich
    don't \mind what she says kümmer dich nicht darum, was sie sagt
    and never \mind the expense und vergiss jetzt einfach mal die Kosten
    never \mind them — what about me? was kümmern mich die — was ist mit mir?
    never \mind her! vergiss sie doch einfach!
    never \mind how you got there... ist doch egal, wie du da hinkamst,...
    \mind your own business! kümmer dich um deine eigenen Angelegenheiten!
    I don't \mind the heat die Hitze macht mir nichts aus!
    I don't \mind what she does es ist mir egal, was sie macht!
    ▪ to \mind that... denk daran, dass...
    \mind you close the door when you leave vergiss nicht, die Tür zuzumachen, wenn du gehst
    \mind you get this done before she gets home sieh zu, dass du damit fertig wirst, bevor sie nach Hause kommt
    4. (look after)
    ▪ to \mind sb/sth auf jdn/etw aufpassen; ( fig)
    I'm \minding the shop ich kümmere mich hier um den Laden
    5. ( fam: object)
    ▪ to not \mind sth nichts gegen etw akk [einzuwenden] haben
    would you \mind holding this for me? würden Sie das [kurz] für mich halten?
    do you \mind my asking you a question? darf ich Ihnen eine Frage stellen?
    do you \mind calling me a taxi? würde es dir was ausmachen, mir ein Taxi zu rufen?
    do you \mind my smoking? stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?
    I don't \mind her ich habe nichts gegen sie
    I wouldn't \mind a new car/a cup of tea gegen ein neues Auto/eine Tasse Tee hätte ich nichts einzuwenden!
    6.
    ▶ to \mind one's p's and q's sich akk gut benehmen
    ▶ \mind you allerdings
    \mind you, I'd love to have a cup of tea! also, gegen eine Tasse Tee hätte ich jetzt nichts einzuwenden!
    \mind you, she did try immerhin hat sie es versucht!
    III. vi
    1. (care) sich dat etwas daraus machen
    I don't \mind das ist mir egal
    sometime I wish he \minded a little more manchmal wünsche ich mir, dass es ihm ein bisschen mehr ausmachen würde
    never \mind! [ist doch] egal!
    never \mind, I'll do it myself! vergiss es, ich mach's selbst!
    never \mind, one day... mach dir nichts draus — eines Tages...
    never \mind about that mistake vergiss den Fehler einfach!
    never \mind about that now vergiss das jetzt mal
    never \mind about her — what about you? jetzt vergiss sie doch mal — was ist mit dir?
    never you \mind! jetzt kümmer dich mal nicht drum!
    2. (object) etwas dagegen haben
    do you \mind if I...? stört es Sie, wenn ich...?
    do you \mind! (don't!) ich muss doch sehr bitten!; (may I?) darf ich?
    nobody will \mind das wird niemanden stören
    if you don't \mind... wenn du nichts dagegen hast,...
    if you don't \mind me saying so,... ich hoffe, es macht dir nichts aus, dass ich dir das jetzt sage, aber...
    I don't \mind if I do ich hätte nichts dagegen
    3.
    ▶ never \mind... geschweige denn...
    * * *
    [maɪnd]
    1. NOUN
    1) = intellect Geist m (ALSO PHILOS), Verstand m

    to have a good mind —

    it's all in the mind —

    in one's mind's eye — vor seinem geistigen Auge, im Geiste

    to blow sb's mind (inf) — jdn umwerfen (inf); (drugs) jdn high machen (inf) → boggle, great, improve

    a triumph of mind over matter — ein Triumph des Geistes or Willens über den Körper

    2) = way of thinking Denkweise f; (= type of mind) Geist m, Kopf m

    to the child's/Victorian mind — in der Denkweise des Kindes/der viktorianischen Zeit

    to have a literary/logical etc mind — literarisch/logisch etc veranlagt sein

    state or frame of mind — (seelische) Verfassung, (Geistes)zustand m

    3) = thoughts Gedanken pl

    to be clear in one's mind about sth — sich (dat) über etw im Klaren sein

    she couldn't get or put the song/him out of her mind —

    his mind is set on that — er hat sich (dat) das in den Kopf gesetzt

    4) = memory Gedächtnis nt

    to bring or call sth to mind — etw in Erinnerung rufen, an etw (acc) erinnern

    5) = inclination Lust f; (= intention) Sinn m, Absicht f

    I've half a mind/a good mind to... —

    to be of a mind to do sth — geneigt sein, etw zu tun (geh)

    6) = opinion Meinung f, Ansicht f

    to change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern (about über +acc ), es sich (dat) anders überlegen

    to be in two minds about sth — sich (dat) über etw (acc) nicht im Klaren sein

    I'm of the same mind as you — ich denke wie du, ich bin deiner Meinung

    with one mind —

    7) = sanity Verstand m, Sinne pl

    to lose one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

    nobody in his right mind —

    8)

    set structures __diams; in mind to bear or keep sth in mind — etw nicht vergessen; facts also, application etw im Auge behalten

    to bear or keep sb in mind — an jdn denken; applicant also jdn im Auge behalten

    with this in mind... — mit diesem Gedanken im Hinterkopf...

    to have sb/sth in mind — an jdn/etw denken

    to have in mind to do sth — vorhaben or im Sinn haben, etw zu tun

    to have it in mind to do sth — beabsichtigen or sich (dat) vorgenommen haben, etw zu tun

    it puts me in mind of sb/sth — es weckt in mir Erinnerungen an jdn/etw

    to go out of one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

    to go out of one's mind with worry/grief — vor Sorge/Trauer den Verstand verlieren

    to drive sb out of his mind — jdn um den Verstand bringen, jdn wahnsinnig machen

    2. TRANSITIVE VERB
    1) = look after aufpassen auf (+acc); sb's chair, seat frei halten
    2) = be careful of aufpassen auf (+acc); (= pay attention to) achten auf (+acc); (= act in accordance with) beachten

    mind what you're doing! —

    mind what you're doing with that car mind what I say! (= do as I tell you) — pass mit dem Auto auf lass dir das gesagt sein hör auf das, was ich dir sage

    mind how you go — passen Sie auf, wo Sie hintreten

    mind your head! (Brit) — Kopf einziehen (inf), Vorsicht, niedrige Tür/Decke etc

    mind your feet! (Brit) (when sitting) — zieh die Füße ein!; (when moving) pass auf, wo du hintrittst!

    3) = care about sich kümmern um; (= object to) etwas haben gegen

    she minds/doesn't mind it — es macht ihr etwas/nichts aus

    I don't mind what he does —

    I don't mind four but six is too many — ich habe nichts gegen vier, aber sechs sind zu viel

    would you mind opening the door? — wären Sie so freundlich, die Tür aufzumachen?

    do you mind my smoking? —

    I don't mind telling you, I was shocked — ich war schockiert, das kannst du mir glauben

    I hope you don't mind my asking you/sitting here — ich hoffe, Sie haben nichts dagegen, wenn ich Sie frage/dass ich hier sitze

    don't mind me — lass dich (durch mich) nicht stören; (iro) nimm auf mich keine Rücksicht

    never mind the expense — (es ist) egal, was es kostet

    never mind that now — das ist jetzt nicht wichtig, lass das doch jetzt

    never mind your back, I'm worried about... — dein Rücken ist mir doch egal, ich mache mir Sorgen um...

    3. INTRANSITIVE VERB
    1) = care, worry sich kümmern, sich (dat) etwas daraus machen; (= object) etwas dagegen haben

    he doesn't seem to mind about anything —

    I wish he minded a little — ich wünschte, es würde ihm etwas ausmachen or ihn ein bisschen kümmern

    nobody seemed to mind — es schien keinem etwas auszumachen, niemand schien etwas dagegen zu haben

    I'd prefer to stand, if you don't mind — ich würde lieber stehen, wenn es Ihnen recht ist

    do you mind if I open or would you mind if I opened the window? — macht es Ihnen etwas aus, wenn ich das Fenster öffne?

    I don't mind if I do — ich hätte nichts dagegen __diams; never mind macht nichts, ist doch egal; (in exasperation) ist ja auch egal, schon gut

    never mind, you'll find another — mach dir nichts draus, du findest bestimmt einen anderen

    oh, never mind, I'll do it myself — ach, lass (es) or schon gut, ich mache es selbst

    never mind about that now! —

    never mind about what you said to him, what did he say to you? — es ist doch egal or unwichtig, was du zu ihm gesagt hast, was hat er zu dir gesagt?

    I'm not going to finish school, never mind go to university — ich werde die Schule nicht beenden und schon gar nicht zur Universität gehen __diams; never you mind! kümmere du dich mal nicht darum

    2) = be sure aufpassen

    mind and see if... — sieh zu, ob...

    mind you get that done — sieh zu, dass du das fertig bekommst

    I'm not saying I'll do it, mind — ich will damit aber nicht sagen, dass ich es tue

    he's not a bad lad, mind, just... — er ist eigentlich kein schlechter Junge, nur...

    he didn't do it, mind — er hat es (ja) nicht getan __diams; mind you

    mind you, I'd rather not go — ich würde eigentlich or allerdings lieber nicht gehen

    it was raining at the time, mind you — allerdings hat es da geregnet

    mind you, he did try/ask — er hat es immerhin versucht/hat immerhin gefragt

    he's quite good, mind you — er ist eigentlich ganz gut

    4. PHRASAL VERB
    * * *
    mind [maınd]
    A s
    1. Sinn m, Gemüt n, Herz n:
    his mind was on her all time er musste die ganze Zeit an sie denken;
    go through sb’s mind jemandem durch den Kopf gehen;
    have sth on one’s mind etwas auf dem Herzen haben;
    that might take his mind off his worries das lenkt ihn vielleicht von seinen Sorgen ab;
    his mind was not fully on the job er war nicht ganz bei der Sache; → weight A 7
    2. Seele f, Verstand m, Geist m:
    before one’s mind’s eye vor seinem geistigen Auge;
    see sth in one’s mind’s eye etwas im Geiste vor sich sehen;
    be of sound mind, be in one’s right mind bei (vollem) Verstand sein;
    anybody in their right mind jeder halbwegs Normale;
    it is all in the mind das ist rein seelisch bedingt oder reine Einbildung (Krankheit etc);
    of sound mind and memory JUR im Vollbesitz seiner geistigen Kräfte;
    of unsound mind geistesgestört, unzurechnungsfähig;
    be out of one’s mind nicht (recht) bei Sinnen sein, verrückt sein;
    drive ( oder send) sb out of their mind jemanden verrückt machen;
    lose one’s mind den Verstand verlieren;
    close ( oder shut) one’s mind to sth sich gegen etwas verschließen;
    have an open mind unvoreingenommen sein;
    keep an open mind sich noch nicht festlegen;
    cast back one’s mind sich zurückversetzen (to nach, in akk);
    enter sb’s mind jemandem in den Sinn kommen;
    give ( oder put, set) one’s mind to sth sich mit einer Sache befassen, sich einer Sache widmen;
    pay no mind to nicht achten auf (akk);
    put sth out of one’s mind sich etwas aus dem Kopf schlagen;
    read sb’s mind jemandes Gedanken lesen;
    set one’s mind on sth sich etwas in den Kopf setzen;
    set one’s mind on doing sth es sich in den Kopf setzen, etwas zu tun;
    it has slipped (from) my mind es ist mir entfallen; → blow1 C 7, presence 1
    3. Geist m ( auch PHIL):
    things of the mind geistige Dinge;
    his is a fine mind er hat einen feinen Verstand, er ist ein kluger Kopf;
    one of the greatest minds of his time fig einer der größten Geister seiner Zeit;
    the best minds in the country die klügsten Köpfe im Lande;
    (the triumph of) mind over matter der Sieg des Geistes über die Materie; → history 1
    4. Meinung f, Ansicht f:
    in ( oder to) my mind
    a) meiner Ansicht nach, meines Erachtens,
    b) nach meinem Sinn oder Geschmack;
    be of sb’s mind jemandes Meinung sein;
    change one’s mind sich anders besinnen, es sich anders überlegen;
    change one’s mind about seine Meinung ändern über (akk);
    speak one’s mind (freely) seine Meinung frei äußern;
    give sb a piece ( oder bit) of one’s mind jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen;
    know one’s (own) mind wissen, was man will;
    be in (US of) two minds about mit sich selbst nicht einig sein über (akk);
    there can be no two minds about it darüber kann es keine geteilte Meinung geben;
    be of one mind einer Meinung sein (about, on über akk);
    many men, many minds (Sprichwort) viele Köpfe, viele Sinne
    5. Neigung f, Lust f, Absicht f:
    have a good (half a) mind to do sth gute (nicht übel) Lust haben, etwas zu tun;
    have sth in mind etwas im Sinn haben;
    this is exactly what I had in mind das ist genau das, was mir vorschwebte oder was ich mir vorstellte;
    I have you in mind ich denke (dabei) an dich;
    have it in mind to do sth beabsichtigen, etwas zu tun;
    make up one’s mind
    a) sich entschließen, einen Entschluss fassen,
    b) zu dem Schluss oder zu der Überzeugung kommen ( that dass), sich klar werden ( about über akk);
    have you made up your mind yet? (im Restaurant) haben Sie schon gewählt?;
    I can’t make up your mind! du musst deine Entscheidung(en) schon selbst treffen!
    6. Erinnerung f, Gedächtnis n:
    bear ( oder keep) sth in mind (immer) an eine Sache denken, etwas nicht vergessen, etwas bedenken, etwas im Auge halten;
    a) etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, an eine Sache erinnern,
    b) sich etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, sich an eine Sache erinnern;
    I can’t get it out of my mind ich muss ständig daran denken, es beschäftigt mich ständig;
    it went ( right, umg clean) out of his mind er hat es (ganz oder total) vergessen;
    put sb in mind of sth jemanden an etwas erinnern;
    nothing comes to mind nichts fällt einem (dabei) ein;
    from time out of mind seit undenklichen Zeiten; → erase 3, wipe out 2
    B v/t
    1. beachten, achtgeben oder achten auf (akk):
    mind you write umg denk daran oder vergiss nicht zu schreiben
    2. achtgeben auf (akk), sich hüten vor (dat):
    mind your head! stoß dir den Kopf nicht an!; → step A 1, A 7, A 9
    3. sorgen für, sehen nach:
    mind the fire nach dem Feuer sehen;
    mind the children sich um die Kinder kümmern, die Kinder hüten oder beaufsichtigen;
    mind your own business kümmere dich um deine eigenen Dinge!;
    never mind him kümmere dich nicht um ihn!;
    never you mind what … umg es geht dich gar nichts an, was …;
    don’t mind me lassen Sie sich durch mich nicht stören!
    4. etwas haben gegen, etwas nicht gern sehen oder mögen, sich stoßen an (dat):
    do you mind my smoking? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;
    would you mind coming? würden Sie so freundlich sein zu kommen?;
    she was, she didn’t mind admitting, very lonely sie war, wie sie unumwunden oder freimütig zugab, sehr einsam;
    I don’t mind it ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);
    I would not mind a cup of coffee ich hätte nichts gegen eine Tasse Kaffee
    5. schott sich erinnern an (akk)
    C v/i
    1. aufpassen:
    a) wohlgemerkt,
    b) allerdings;
    he’s very nice, mind you, but … er ist eigentlich sehr nett, aber …;
    never mind lass es gut sein!, es hat nichts zu sagen!, macht nichts!, schon gut! ( → C 2)
    2. etwas dagegen haben:
    I don’t mind ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);
    I don’t mind if he goes meinetwegen kann er gehen;
    do you mind if I smoke? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;
    I don’t mind if I do umg
    a) ja, ganz gern oder ich möchte schon,
    b) ich bin so frei;
    nobody seemed to mind es schien niemandem etwas auszumachen;
    do you mind!
    a) ich muss doch sehr bitten!,
    b) passen Sie doch auf!;
    do you mind!, can’t you see I’m busy? sehen Sie (denn) nicht, dass ich beschäftigt bin?;
    he minds a great deal es macht ihm sehr viel aus, es stört ihn sehr;
    never mind mach dir nichts draus! ( → C 1)
    3. mind out Br aufpassen ( for auf akk)
    * * *
    1. noun

    bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

    have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

    it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

    put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

    in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

    be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

    be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

    I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

    make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

    make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

    give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

    I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

    something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

    close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

    frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

    state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

    be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

    5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

    in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

    nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

    6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

    have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

    great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

    7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

    lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

    2. transitive verb

    let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

    he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

    I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

    never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

    never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

    don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

    3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

    did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

    do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

    mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

    mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

    mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

    5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

    mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)

    3. intransitive verb
    1)

    mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

    2) usu. in imper. (take note)

    follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

    I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

    3) (care, object)

    do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

    he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

    never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

    never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

    never mind about that now! — lass das jetzt mal [sein/liegen]!

    Phrasal Verbs:
    * * *
    n.
    Absicht -en f.
    Ansicht -en f.
    Geist -er m.
    Gemüt -er n.
    Meinung -en f.
    Phantasie -n f.
    Sinn -e m.
    Verstand -¨e m. v.
    beachten v.

    English-german dictionary > mind

  • 3 Mind-body Problem

       From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)
        still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)
       here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)
       With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)
       [The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)
       The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)
       We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)
       Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem

  • 4 Cognitive Science

       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive Science
       I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)
        Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.
        Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.
       There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)
       What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.
       The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....
       This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)
       Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science

  • 5 make up one's mind

    1) решиться, принять решение

    Back in 1938 I started to study nuclear physics. Torn between two loves, science and literature, I could not make up my mind which field to choose. (R. E. Lapp, ‘Atoms and People’, ch. I) — я начал изучать ядерную физику еще в 1938 году. Меня в равной степени влекло и к точным наукам, и к литературе, и я долго не мог решить, по какому пути пойти.

    ‘But I oughtn't to conceal from you that I don't feel inclined to accept the Master's kind invitation.’ ‘Don't make up your mind yet.’ ‘I'm very much afraid it is made up,’ said Jago. (C. P. Snow, ‘The Affair’, ch. 24) — - Не стану скрывать от вас, - продолжал Яго, - что мне вовсе не улыбается принимать любезное приглашение ректора. - Подождите с окончательным решением. - Боюсь, что это вопрос уже решенный, - сказал Яго.

    My mind is made up, and that's all there is to it. (E. Caldwell, ‘Jackpot’, ‘The People vs. Abe Lathan, Colored’) — Решение мое твердо, и говорить больше не о чем.

    2) (to smth.) примириться с чем-л., свыкнуться с мыслью о чём-л.

    After Julia had made up her mind to that she was glad. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Theatre’, ch. XXIII) — После того, как Джулия свыклась с мыслью об отъезде, она даже испытывала чувство радости.

    The Maiden: "It is not the ageing that is so rapid. It is the realization of it when it has actually happened. Now that I have made up my mind to the fact that I have left childhood behind me, it comes home to me in leaps and bounds with every word you say." (B. Shaw, ‘Back to Methuselah’, part V) — Дева: "Не так быстро взрослеешь, как осознаешь, что стал взрослым. я уже свыклась с мыслью, что детство позади, но каждое наше слово будит воспоминания об ушедшей поре."

    Large English-Russian phrasebook > make up one's mind

  • 6 come into one's mind

    (come into (или to) one's mind (тж. come to mind))
    прийти в голову, на ум

    He judged by the wondering look on her face that this was the first hint of natural science that had ever come to her mind. (U. Sinclair, ‘Oil!’, ch. IV) — По изумленному выражению ее лица Бенни понял, что его объяснение причин землетрясений было первой встречей Руфи с естественными науками.

    He tried to think of something to say that would make her feel better, but nothing that came to mind seemed appropriate at the moment. (E. Caldwell, ‘Tragic Ground’, ch. XIV) — Ему хотелось сказать что-нибудь, чтобы подбодрить мисс Сондерс, но ничего подходящего не приходило в голову.

    His son and daughter frequently came into his mind. (E. Caldwell, ‘A Lamp for Nightfall’, ch. XX) — Он часто думал о сыне и дочери.

    Large English-Russian phrasebook > come into one's mind

  • 7 salvation (In Christian Science, the realization of the supremacy of infinite Mind over all bringing with it the destruction of the illusion of sin, sickness, and death)

    Религия: торжество безграничного Разума над грехом, болезнями и смертью

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > salvation (In Christian Science, the realization of the supremacy of infinite Mind over all bringing with it the destruction of the illusion of sin, sickness, and death)

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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 9 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 10 БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ

    Мы приняли следующие сокращения для наиболее часто упоминаемых книг и журналов:
    IJP - International Journal of Psycho-analysis
    JAPA - Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association
    SE - Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953—74.)
    PSOC - Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (New Haven: Yale University Press)
    PQ - Psychoanalytic Quarterly
    WAF - The Writings of Anna Freud, ed. Anna Freud (New York: International Universities Press, 1966—74)
    PMC - Psychoanalysis The Major Concepts ed. Burness E. Moore and Bernard D. Fine (New Haven: Yale University Press)
    \
    О словаре: _about - Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts
    \
    1. Abend, S. M. Identity. PMC. Forthcoming.
    2. Abend, S. M. (1974) Problems of identity. PQ, 43.
    3. Abend, S. M., Porder, M. S. & Willick, M. S. (1983) Borderline Patients. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    4. Abraham, K. (1916) The first pregenital stage of libido. Selected Papers. London, Hogarth Press, 1948.
    5. Abraham, K. (1917) Ejaculatio praecox. In: selected Papers. New York Basic Books.
    6. Abraham, K. (1921) Contributions to the theory of the anal character. Selected Papers. New York: Basic Books, 1953.
    7. Abraham, K. (1924) A Short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In: Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1927.
    8. Abraham, K. (1924) Manic-depressive states and the pre-genital levels of the libido. In: Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1949.
    9. Abraham, K. (1924) Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1948.
    10. Abraham, K. (1924) The influence of oral erotism on character formation. Ibid.
    11. Abraham, K. (1925) The history of an impostor in the light of psychoanalytic knowledge. In: Clinical Papers and Essays on Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books, 1955, vol. 2.
    12. Abrams, S. (1971) The psychoanalytic unconsciousness. In: The Unconscious Today, ed. M. Kanzer. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    13. Abrams, S. (1981) Insight. PSOC, 36.
    14. Abse, D W. (1985) The depressive character In Depressive States and their Treatment, ed. V. Volkan New York: Jason Aronson.
    15. Abse, D. W. (1985) Hysteria and Related Mental Disorders. Bristol: John Wright.
    16. Ackner, B. (1954) Depersonalization. J. Ment. Sci., 100.
    17. Adler, A. (1924) Individual Psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
    18. Akhtar, S. (1984) The syndrome of identity diffusion. Amer. J. Psychiat., 141.
    19. Alexander, F. (1950) Psychosomatic Medicine. New York: Norton.
    20. Allen, D. W. (1974) The Feat- of Looking. Charlottesvill, Va: Univ. Press of Virginia.
    21. Allen, D. W. (1980) Psychoanalytic treatment of the exhibitionist. In: Exhibitionist, Description, Assessment, and Treatment, ed. D. Cox. New York: Garland STPM Press.
    22. Allport, G. (1937) Personality. New York: Henry Holt.
    23. Almansi, R. J. (1960) The face-breast equation. JAPA, 6.
    24. Almansi, R. J. (1979) Scopophilia and object loss. PQ, 47.
    25. Altman, L. Z. (1969) The Dream in Psychoanalysis. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    26. Altman, L. Z. (1977) Some vicissitudes of love. JAPA, 25.
    27. American Psychiatric Association. (1987) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3d ed. revised. Washington, D. C.
    28. Ansbacher, Z. & Ansbacher, R. (1956) The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. New York: Basic Books.
    29. Anthony, E. J. (1981) Shame, guilt, and the feminine self in psychoanalysis. In: Object and Self, ed. S. Tuttman, C. Kaye & M. Zimmerman. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    30. Arlow. J. A. (1953) Masturbation and symptom formation. JAPA, 1.
    31. Arlow. J. A. (1959) The structure of the deja vu experience. JAPA, 7.
    32. Arlow. J. A. (1961) Ego psychology and the study of mythology. JAPA, 9.
    33. Arlow. J. A. (1963) Conflict, regression and symptom formation. IJP, 44.
    34. Arlow. J. A. (1966) Depersonalization and derealization. In: Psychoanalysis: A General Psychology, ed. R. M. Loewenstein, L. M. Newman, M. Schur & A. J. Solnit. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    35. Arlow. J. A. (1969) Fantasy, memory and reality testing. PQ, 38.
    36. Arlow. J. A. (1969) Unconscious fantasy and disturbances of mental experience. PQ, 38.
    37. Arlow. J. A. (1970) The psychopathology of the psychoses. IJP, 51.
    38. Arlow. J. A. (1975) The structural hypothesis. PQ, 44.
    39. Arlow. J. A. (1977) Affects and the psychoanalytic situation. IJP, 58.
    40. Arlow. J. A. (1979) Metaphor and the psychoanalytic situation. PQ, 48.
    41. Arlow. J. A. (1979) The genesis of interpretation. JAPA, 27 (suppl.).
    42. Arlow. J. A. (1982) Problems of the superego concept. PSOC, 37.
    43. Arlow. J. A. (1984) Disturbances of the sense of time. PQ, 53.
    44. Arlow. J. A. (1985) Some technical problems of countertransference. PQ, 54.
    45. Arlow, J. A. & Brenner, C. (1963) Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory, New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    46. Arlow, J. A. & Brenner, C. (1969) The psychopathology of the psychoses. IJP, 50.
    47. Asch, S. S. (1966) Depression. PSOC, 21.
    48. Asch, S. S. (1976) Varieties of negative therapeutic reactions and problems of technique. JAPA, 24.
    49. Atkins, N. (1970) The Oedipus myth. Adolescence, and the succession of generations. JAPA, 18.
    50. Atkinson, J. W. & Birch, D. (1970) The Dynamics of Action. New York: Wiley.
    51. Bachrach, H. M. & Leaff, L. A. (1978) Analyzability. JAPA, 26.
    52. Bacon, C. (1956) A developmental theory of female homosexuality. In: Perversions,ed, S. Lorand & M. Balint. New York: Gramercy.
    53. Bak, R. C. (1953) Fetishism. JAPA. 1.
    54. Bak, R. C. (1968) The phallic woman. PSOC, 23.
    55. Bak, R. C. & Stewart, W. A. (1974) Fetishism, transvestism, and voyeurism. An American Handbook of Psychiatry, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books, vol. 3.
    56. Balint, A. (1949) Love for mother and mother-love. IJP, 30.
    57. Balter, L., Lothane, Z. & Spencer, J. H. (1980) On the analyzing instrument, PQ, 49.
    58. Basch, M. F. (1973) Psychoanalysis and theory formation. Ann. Psychoanal., 1.
    59. Basch, M. F. (1976) The concept of affect. JAPA, 24.
    60. Basch, M. F. (1981) Selfobject disorders and psychoanalytic theory. JAPA, 29.
    61. Basch, M. F. (1983) Emphatic understanding. JAPA. 31.
    62. Balldry, F. Character. PMC. Forthcoming.
    63. Balldry, F. (1983) The evolution of the concept of character in Freud's writings. JAPA. 31.
    64. Begelman, D. A. (1971) Misnaming, metaphors, the medical model and some muddles. Psychiatry, 34.
    65. Behrends, R. S. & Blatt, E. J. (1985) Internalization and psychological development throughout the life cycle. PSOC, 40.
    66. Bell, A. (1961) Some observations on the role of the scrotal sac and testicles JAPA, 9.
    67. Benedeck, T. (1949) The psychosomatic implications of the primary unit. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., 19.
    68. Beres, C. (1958) Vicissitudes of superego functions and superego precursors in childhood. FSOC, 13.
    69. Beres, D. Conflict. PMC. Forthcoming.
    70. Beres, D. (1956) Ego deviation and the concept of schizophrenia. PSOC, 11.
    71. Beres, D. (1960) Perception, imagination and reality. IJP, 41.
    72. Beres, D. (1960) The psychoanalytic psychology of imagination. JAPA, 8.
    73. Beres, D. & Joseph, E. D. (1965) Structure and function in psychoanalysis. IJP, 46.
    74. Beres, D. (1970) The concept of mental representation in psychoanalysis. IJP, 51.
    75. Berg, M D. (1977) The externalizing transference. IJP, 58.
    76. Bergeret, J. (1985) Reflection on the scientific responsi bilities of the International Psychoanalytical Association. Memorandum distributed at 34th IPA Congress, Humburg.
    77. Bergman, A. (1978) From mother to the world outside. In: Grolnick et. al. (1978).
    78. Bergmann, M. S. (1980) On the intrapsychic function of falling in love. PQ, 49.
    79. Berliner, B. (1966) Psychodynamics of the depressive character. Psychoanal. Forum, 1.
    80. Bernfeld, S. (1931) Zur Sublimierungslehre. Imago, 17.
    81. Bibring, E. (1937) On the theory of the therapeutic results of psychoanalysis. IJP, 18.
    82. Bibring, E. (1941) The conception of the repetition compulsion. PQ, 12.
    83. Bibring, E. (1953) The mechanism of depression. In: Affective Disorders, ed. P. Greenacre. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    84. Bibring, E. (1954) Psychoanalysis and the dynamic psychotherapies. JAPA, 2.
    85. Binswanger, H. (1963) Positive aspects of the animus. Zьrich: Spring.
    86. Bion Francesca Abingdon: Fleetwood Press.
    87. Bion, W. R. (1952) Croup dynamics. IJP, 33.
    88. Bion, W. R. (1961) Experiences in Groups. London: Tavistock.
    89. Bion, W. R. (1962) A theory of thinking. IJP, 40.
    90. Bion, W. R. (1962) Learning from Experience. London: William Heinemann.
    91. Bion, W. R. (1963) Elements of Psychoanalysis. London: William Heinemann.
    92. Bion, W. R. (1965) Transformations. London: William Heinemann.
    93. Bion, W. R. (1970) Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock.
    94. Bion, W. R. (1985) All My Sins Remembered, ed. Francesca Bion. Adingdon: Fleetwood Press.
    95. Bird, B. (1972) Notes on transference. JAPA, 20.
    96. Blanck, G. & Blanck, R. (1974) Ego Psychology. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
    97. Blatt, S. J. (1974) Levels of object representation in anaclitic and introjective depression. PSOC, 29.
    98. Blau, A. (1955) A unitary hypothesis of emotion. PQ, 24.
    99. Bleuler, E. (1911) Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias. New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1951.
    100. Blos, P. (1954) Prolonged adolescence. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., 24.
    101. Blos, P. (1962) On Adolescence. New York: Free Press.
    102. Blos, P. (1972) The epigenesia of the adult neurosis. 27.
    103. Blos, P. (1979) Modification in the traditional psychoanalytic theory of adolescent development. Adolescent Psychiat., 8.
    104. Blos, P. (1984) Son and father. JAPA_. 32.
    105. Blum, G. S. (1963) Prepuberty and adolescence, In Studies ed. R. E. Grinder. New York: McMillan.
    106. Blum, H. P. Symbolism. FMC. Forthcoming.
    107. Blum, H. P. (1976) Female Psychology. JAPA, 24 (suppl.).
    108. Blum, H. P. (1976) Masochism, the ego ideal and the psychology of women. JAPA, 24 (suppl.).
    109. Blum, H. P. (1980) The value of reconstruction in adult psychoanalysis. IJP, 61.
    110. Blum, H. P. (1981) Forbidden quest and the analytic ideal. PQ, 50.
    111. Blum, H. P. (1983) Defense and resistance. Foreword. JAFA, 31.
    112. Blum, H. P., Kramer, Y., Richards, A. K. & Richards, A. D., eds. (1988) Fantasy, Myth and Reality: Essays in Honor of Jacob A. Arlow. Madison, Conn.: Int. Univ. Press.
    113. Boehm, F. (1930) The femininity-complex In men. IJP,11.
    114. Boesky, D. Structural theory. PMC. Forthcoming.
    115. Boesky, D. (1973) Deja raconte as a screen defense. PQ, 42.
    116. Boesky, D. (1982) Acting out. IJP, 63.
    117. Boesky, D. (1986) Questions about Sublimation In Psychoanalysis the Science of Mental Conflict, ed. A. D. Richards & M. S. Willick. Hillsdale, N. J.: Analytic Press.
    118. Bornstein, B. (1935) Phobia in a 2 1/2-year-old child. PQ, 4.
    119. Bornstein, B. (1951) On latency. PSOC, 6.
    120. Bornstein, M., ed. (1983) Values and neutrality in psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Inquiry, 3.
    121. Bowlby, J. (1960) Grief and morning in infancy and early childhood. PSOC. 15.
    122. Bowlby, J. (1961) Process of mourning. IJP. 42.
    123. Bowlby, J. (1980) Attachment and Loss, vol. 3. New York: Basic Books.
    124. Bradlow, P. A. (1973) Depersonalization, ego splitting, non-human fantasy and shame. IJP, 54.
    125. Brazelton, T. B., Kozlowsky, B. & Main, M. (1974) The early motherinfant interaction. In: The Effect of the Infant on Its Caregiver, ed. M. Lewis & L. Rosenblum New York Wiley.
    126. Brenner, C. (1957) The nature and development of the concept of repression in Freud's writings. PSOC, 12.
    127. Brenner, C. (1959) The masochistic character. JAPA, 7.
    128. Brenner, C. (1973) An Elementary Textbook of Psycho-analysis. New York Int. Univ. Press.
    129. Brenner, C. (1974) On the nature and development of affects PQ, 43.
    130. Brenner, C. (1976) Psychoanalytic Technique and Psychic Conflict. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    131. Brenner, C. (1979) The Mind in Conflict. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    132. Brenner, C. (1979) Working alliance, therapeutic alliance and transference. JAPA, 27.
    133. Brenner, C. (1981) Defense and defense mechanisms. PQ, 50.
    134. Brenner, C. (1983) Defense. In: the Mind in Conflict. New York Int. Univ. Press.
    135. Bressler, B. (1965) The concept of the self. Psychoanalytic Review, 52.
    136. Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1983—95) Studies on Hysteria. SE, 3.
    137. Breznitz, S., ed. (1983) The Denial of Stress. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    138. Brody, S. (1964) Passivity. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    139. Brown, H. (1970) Psycholinquistics. New York: Free Press.
    140. Bruner, J. S. (1964) The course of cognitive growth. Amer. Psychologist. 19.
    141. Bruner, J., Jolly, A. & Sylva, K. (1976) Play. New York Basic Books.
    142. Bruner, J. E., Olver, R. R. &Greenfield, P. M. (1966) Studies in Cognitive Growth. New York: Wiley.
    143. Buie, D H. (1981) Empathy. JAPA, 29.
    144. Burgner, M. & Edgeumble, R. (1972) Some problems in the conceptualization of early object relationships. PSOC, 27.
    145. Call, J. ed. (1979) Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.
    146. Carroll, G. (1956) Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge & London: M. I. T. Press & John Wiley.
    147. Cavenar, J. O. & Nash, J. L. (1976) The effects of Combat on the normal personality. Comprehensive Psychiat., 17.
    148. Chassequet-Smirgel, J. (1978) Reflections on the connection between perversion and sadism. IJP, 59.
    149. Chomsky, N. (1978) Language and unconscious knowledge. In: Psychoanalysis and Language, ed. J. H. Smith. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, vol. 3.
    150. Clower, V. (1975) Significance of masturbation in female sexual development and function. In: Masturbation from Infancy to Senescence, ed. I. Marcus & J. Francis. New York: Int. Uni" Press.
    151. Coen, S. J. & Bradlow, P. A. (1982) Twin transference as a compromise formation. JAPA, 30.
    152. Compton, A. Object and relationships. PMC. Forthcoming.
    153. Cullen, W. (1777) First Lines of the Practice of Psysic. Edinburgh: Bell, Brandfute.
    154. Curtis, B. C. (1969) Psychoanalytic understanding and treatment of impotence. In: Sexual Function and Dysfunction, ed. P. J. Fink & V. B. O. Hummett. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis.
    155. Darwin, C. (1874) The Descent of Man. New York: Hurst.
    156. Davidoff-Hirsch, H. (1985) Oedipal and preoedipal phenomena. JAPA, 33.
    157. Davis, M. & Wallbridge, D. (1981) Boundary and Space. New York: Brunner-Mazel.
    158. Deutsch, H. (1932) Homosexuality in women. PQ, 1.
    159. Deutsch, H. (1934) Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. PQ, 11.
    160. Deutsch, H. (1937) Absence of grief. PQ, 6.
    161. Deutsch, H. (1942) Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia. PQ, 11.
    162. Deutsch, H. (1955) The impostor. In: Neuroses and Character Types. New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1965.
    163. Devereux, G. (1953) Why Oedipus killed Lains. IJP, 34.
    164. Dewald, P. (1982) Psychoanalytic perspectives On resistance. In: resistance, Psychodynamics. and Behavioral Approaches, ed. P. Wachtel. New York: Plenum Press.
    165. Dickes, R. (1963) Fetishistic behavior. JAPA. 11.
    166. Dickes, R. (1965) The defensive function of an altered state of consciousness. JAPA, 13.
    167. Dickes, R. (1967) Severe regressive disruption of the therapeutic alliance. JAPA, 15.
    168. Dickes, R. (1981) Sexual myths and misinformation. In: Understanding Human Behaviour in Health and Illness, ed. R. C. Simon & H. Pardes. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.
    169. Dorpat, T. L. (1985) Denial and Defense in the Therapeutic Situation. New York: Jason Aronson.
    170. Downey, T. W. (1978) Transitional phenomena in the analysis of early adolescent males. PSOC, 33.
    171. Dunbar, F. (1954) Emotions and Bodily Functions. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
    172. Easson, W. M. (1973) The earliest ego development, primitive memory traces, and the Isakower phenomenon. PQ, 42.
    173. Edelheit, H. (1971) Mythopoiesis and the primal scene. Psychoanal. Study Society, 5.
    174. Edgcumbe, R. & Burgner, M. (1972) Some problems in the conceptualization of early object relation ships, part I. PSOC, 27.
    175. Edgcumbe, R. & Burgner, M. (1975) The phallicnarcissistic phase. PSOC, 30.
    176. Eidelberg, L. (1960) A third contribution to the study of slips of the tongue. IJP, 41.
    177. Eidelberg, L. (1968) Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis. New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-MacMillan.
    178. Eissler, K. R. (1953) The effect of the structure of the ego on psychoanalytic technique. JAPA, 1.
    179. Ellenberg, H. F. (1970) The Discovery of the Unconscious. New York: Basic Books.
    180. Emde, R. N. (1980) Toward a psychoanalytic theory of affect: I. & G. H. Pollock. Washington NYMH.
    181. Emde R., Gaensbaner, T. & Harmon R. (1976) Emotional Expression in Infancy. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    182. Erode R. & Harmon, R. J. (1972) Endogenous and exogenous smiling systems in early infancy. J. Amer. Acad. Child Psychiat., 11.
    183. Engel, G. L. (1962) Psychological Development in Health and Disease. New York Saunders.
    184. Engel, G. L. (1967) Psychoanalytic theory of somatic disorder. JAPA, 15.
    185. Engel, G. L. (1968) A reconsideration of the role of conversion in somatic disease. Compr. Psychiat., 94.
    186. English, H. B. & English, A. C. (1958) A comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms. New York: David McKay.
    187. Erard, R. (1983) New wine in old skins. Int. Rev. Psychoanal., 10.
    188. Erdelyi, M. H. (1985) Psychoanalysis. New York: W. H. Freeman.
    189. Erikson, E. H. (1950) Childhood and Society. New York: Norton.
    190. Erikson, E. H. (1956) The concept of ego identity. JAPA, 4.
    191. Erikson, E. H. (1956) The problem of ego identity. JAPA, 4.
    192. Esman, A. H. (1973) The primal scene. PSOC, 28.
    193. Esman, A. H. (1975) The Psychology of Adolescence. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    194. Esman, A. H. (1979) Some reflections on boredom. JAPA, 27.
    195. Esman, A. H. (1983) The "stimulus barrier": a review and reconsideration. PSOC, 38.
    196. Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1952) Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    197. Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1954) An Object-Relations Theory of the Personality. New York: Basic Books.
    198. Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1963) Synopsis of an Object-Relations theory of the personality. IJP, 44.
    199. Fawcett, J., Clark, D. C., Scheftner, W. H. & Hedecker, D. (1983) Differences between anhedonia and normal hedonic depressive states. Arch. Gen. Psychiat., 40.
    200. Fenichel, O. (1934) On the psychology of boredom. Collected Papers. New York: Norton, 1953, vol. 1.
    201. Fenichel, O. (1941) Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique. Albany, N. Y.: Psychoanalytic Quaterly.
    202. Fenichel, O. (1945) Character disorders. In: The Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neurosis. New York: Norton.
    203. Fenichel, O. (1945) The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis New York: Norton.
    204. Fenichel, O. (1954) Ego strength and ego weakness. Collected Papers. New York: Norton, vol. 2.
    205. Ferenczi, S. (1909) Introjection and transference. In: Sex in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
    206. Ferenczi, S. (191617) Disease or patho-neurosis. The Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press, 1950.
    207. Ferenczi, S. (1925) Psychoanalysis of sexual habits. In: The Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
    208. Fine, B. D., Joseph, E. D. & Waldhorn, H. F., eds. (1971) Recollection and Reconstruction in Psychoanalysis. Monograph 4, Kris Study Group. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    209. Fink, G. (1967) Analysis of the Isakower phenomenon. JAPA, 15.
    210. Fink, P. J. (1970) Correlation between "actual" neurosis and the work of Masters and Johson. P. Q, 39.
    211. Finkenstein, L. (1975) Awe premature ejaculation. P. Q, 44.
    212. Firestein, S. K. (1978) A review of the literature. In: Termination in Psychoanalysis. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    213. Fisher, C. et. al. (1957) A study of the preliminary stages of the construction of dreams and images. JAPA, 5.
    214. Fisher, C. et. al. (1968) Cycle of penile erection synchronous with dreaming (REM) sleep. Arch. Gen. Psychiat., 12.
    215. Fliess, R. (1942) The metapsychology of the analyst. PQ, 12.
    216. Fliess, R. (1953) The Revival of Interest in the Dream. New York: Int. Univ. Press.
    217. Fodor, N. & Gaynor, F. (1950) Freud: Dictionary of Psycho-analysis. New York: Philosophical Library.
    218. Fordham, M. (1969) Children as Individuals. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
    219. Fordham, M. (1976) The Self and Autism. London: Academic Press.
    220. Fraiberg, S. (1969) Object constancy and mental representation. PSOC, 24.
    221. Frank, A. Metapsychology. PMS. Forthcoming.
    222. Frank, A. & Muslin, H. (1967) The development of Freud's concept of primal repression. PSOC, 22.
    223. Frank, H. (1977) Dynamic patterns for failure in college students. Can. Psychiat. Ass. J., 22.
    224. French, T. & Fromm, E. (1964) Dream Interpretation. New York: Basic Books.
    225. Freud, A. (1936) The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York Int. Univ. Press.
    226. Freud, A. (1951) Observations on child development. PSOC, 6.
    227. Freud, A. (1952) The mutual influences in the development of ego and id. WAF, 4.
    228. Freud, A. (1958) Adolescence. WAF, 5.
    229. Freud, A. (1962) Assessment of childhood disturbances. PSOC, 17.
    230. Freud, A. (1962) Comments on psychic trauma. In: Furst (1967).
    231. Freud, A. (1963) The concept of developmental lines. PSOC, 18.
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  • 11 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 12 Psychology

       We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)
       The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)
       Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)
       It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)
       "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,
       The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)
       The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)
       According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)
       At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.
       In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.
       The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.
       Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)
       As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)
       The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology

  • 13 Knowledge

       It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)
       It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.
       But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)
       Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).
       Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])
       Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....
       This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)
       Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)
       Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)
       "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.
       Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge

  • 14 علم

    عِلْم \ knowledge: what one knows: His knowledge of radio is very wide. His general knowledge is slight. learning: knowledge that is gained by long serious study: He is a man of great learning. scholarship: the qualities of a very learned person: This writer on Shakespeare is famous for his scholarship. science: the careful study of any serious subject: political science; the science of language. \ بِغَير عِلْمِه \ behind sb.’s back: when someone is not present: He tells untrue stories about me behind my back. \ عِلْم الآثار القَديمة \ archaeology, archeology: the scientific study of life in the distant past by digging up ancient cities, examining buried objects, etc. \ عِلْم الاجْتِماع \ sociology: the study of society and human behaviour in groups. \ عِلْم الإِحْصَاء \ statistics: (with pl. verb) facts that are shown by numbers; (with sg. verb) the science of showing facts by numbers: National statistics of births and deaths are collected regularly. Statistics is a modern science. \ عِلْم الأَحْياء \ biology: the science of living things. \ عِلْم الأخلاق \ ethics: the study of good and bad in human behaviour. \ عِلْم الأرصاد الجوّيّة \ meteorology: the science of the weather. \ عِلْم الأساطير \ mythology: myths in general; the study of myths. \ عِلْم الاشْتِقاق (في علم اللُّغَة)‏ \ etymology: the study of the history of words. \ عِلْم الأصوات \ phonetics: (as subject of study; pl. as a practical activity) the science of speech sounds; the signs used for these sounds; the practical use of this science: Phonetics is a modern science. Are these phonetics correct? Phonetics help foreigners to pronounce words. \ عِلْم الاقتصاد \ economics: the science of national economy. \ عِلْم الإنْسَان \ anthropology: the scientific study of man, his way of life, religions, races, etc. \ عِلْم بالوُصُول \ acknowledg(e)ment: a note of receipt: I sent the money but I’ve had no acknowledgement. \ عِلْم التاريخ \ history: an orderly record or study of past events: a student of history; the history of Europe. \ عِلْم التَّحْليل النَّفْسي \ psychoanalysis: (the scientific study of) a way of treating disorders ot the mind by examination of all that sb. can remember of his past life, dreams, feelings, etc.. \ عِلْم التَّدْبِير المنزليّ \ domestic science: the study of cooking and other housekeeping skills. \ عِلْم التَّنْجيم \ astrology: the study of the stars in relation to human fate. \ عِلْم الجَبْر \ algebra: a branch of mathematics, using signs and letters as well as numbers. \ عِلْم الجُغْرافيا \ geography: the scientific study of the structure, produce and use of the earth’s surface. \ عِلْم الحَرْب \ warfare: the science of making war; fighting. \ عِلْم حَرَكة السوائل \ hydraulics: the science of controlling and using liquid pressure, esp. for engineering purposes. \ عِلْم الحَشَرات \ entomology: the study of insects. \ عِلْم الحَيَوان \ zoology: the scientific study of animal life. \ عِلْم الرِّياضيّات \ mathematics: the science of numbers and space; the practical use of this science: Mathematics is an exact science. maths: the usual shortening of mathematics. \ عِلْم الزراعة بدون تُربة \ hydroponics: the science of growing plants in water, without soil. \ عِلْم السِّيَاسَة \ politics: (sg. as an art or activity; pl. as personal beliefs, etc.) the art of government; the affairs of government; one’s opinions on government: Is politics an art or a science? My politics are my private concern. \ عِلْم الصحّة \ hygiene: the study and practice of how to keep good health, esp. by paying attention to cleaniness. \ عِلْم صيانة الأحراش \ forestry: the science of growing trees for man’s use as wood. \ عِلْم الطّبّ \ medicine: the science and the art of dealing with disease. \ عِلْم طَبَقات الأرض \ geology: the study of the rocks that make up the earth. \ عِلْم الطبيعة \ physics: the science of heat, light, sound, Motion, etc.: Physics is an important branch of science. \ See Also الفيزياء \ عِلْم طبيعيّ \ science: the study of the substances, forces, etc. found in nature (esp. Biology; Chemistry; Physics): Schools teach science. \ عِلْم الطُّيُور \ ornithology: the scientific study of birds. \ عِلْم الفَلَك \ astronomy: the scientific study of the stars. \ عِلْم الكِيمْياء \ chemistry: the science that studies the nature and behaviour of all substances. \ عِلْم المالية \ finance: the science of controlling money. \ See Also إدارة المال \ عِلْم المَنْطِق \ logic: the science of reasoning. \ عِلْم النَّبَات \ botany: the scientific study of plants. \ عِلْم النَّفْس \ psychology: the scientific study of the mind. \ عِلْم الهَنْدَسة \ geometry: the science of lines, angles, surfaces and solid figures, and of their measurements.

    Arabic-English dictionary > علم

  • 15 extravagancia

    f.
    1 eccentricity.
    2 extravagance, eccentricity, oddity, oddness.
    3 extravagant act, quirk, eccentricity, extravaganza.
    * * *
    1 extravagance, eccentricity
    * * *
    SF
    1) (=cualidad) [de persona, aspecto, ropa] extravagance, outlandishness
    2) (=capricho) whim
    * * *
    femenino ( acto) outrageous thing (to do); ( cualidad) extravagance

    su extravagancia en el vestir — the outlandish o extravagant way he dresses

    * * *
    = flamboyance, extravagance, quirk, outrageousness, exoticism, whimsy, waywardness, geekiness, eccentricity, whim, peculiarity.
    Ex. The flamboyance of the earliest modern face proved evanescent, and it was a restrained interpretation of the design, combining elements of both the English and the French modern faces, that prevailed.
    Ex. Sometimes even an added entry is considered an extravagance.
    Ex. Biographers will find many, hitherto undiscovered, traits of character or quirks of career of the famous or notorious emerging out of apparently insignificant or unremarked ephemera.
    Ex. However, it is ironic that the author's first venture into the world of children's books is a disappointment because it does not have the puerile outrageousness of her 'adult' work.
    Ex. The article is entitled 'Diplomatics for photographic images: academic exoticism?'.
    Ex. Science is not necessarily a subject but a means of controlling the waywardness and whimsy to which the mind is susceptible.
    Ex. Science is not necessarily a subject but a means of controlling the waywardness and whimsy to which the mind is susceptible.
    Ex. We will evaluate proposals on criteria of usefulness, newness, geekiness, and diversity of topics.
    Ex. In spite of his growing eccentricity, fruitful ideas continued to spring from his imagination.
    Ex. If terms are drawn from a controlled vocabulary, the selection of index headings no longer depends entirely upon the whim of the author in framing a title.
    Ex. For, as Panizzi saw it, 'A reader may know the work he requires; he cannot be expected to know all the peculiarities of different editions; and this information he has a right to expect from the catalogues'.
    ----
    * extravagancia típica de los hippies = hippiedom.
    * * *
    femenino ( acto) outrageous thing (to do); ( cualidad) extravagance

    su extravagancia en el vestir — the outlandish o extravagant way he dresses

    * * *
    = flamboyance, extravagance, quirk, outrageousness, exoticism, whimsy, waywardness, geekiness, eccentricity, whim, peculiarity.

    Ex: The flamboyance of the earliest modern face proved evanescent, and it was a restrained interpretation of the design, combining elements of both the English and the French modern faces, that prevailed.

    Ex: Sometimes even an added entry is considered an extravagance.
    Ex: Biographers will find many, hitherto undiscovered, traits of character or quirks of career of the famous or notorious emerging out of apparently insignificant or unremarked ephemera.
    Ex: However, it is ironic that the author's first venture into the world of children's books is a disappointment because it does not have the puerile outrageousness of her 'adult' work.
    Ex: The article is entitled 'Diplomatics for photographic images: academic exoticism?'.
    Ex: Science is not necessarily a subject but a means of controlling the waywardness and whimsy to which the mind is susceptible.
    Ex: Science is not necessarily a subject but a means of controlling the waywardness and whimsy to which the mind is susceptible.
    Ex: We will evaluate proposals on criteria of usefulness, newness, geekiness, and diversity of topics.
    Ex: In spite of his growing eccentricity, fruitful ideas continued to spring from his imagination.
    Ex: If terms are drawn from a controlled vocabulary, the selection of index headings no longer depends entirely upon the whim of the author in framing a title.
    Ex: For, as Panizzi saw it, 'A reader may know the work he requires; he cannot be expected to know all the peculiarities of different editions; and this information he has a right to expect from the catalogues'.
    * extravagancia típica de los hippies = hippiedom.

    * * *
    1 (acto) outrageous thing (to do)
    se puede esperar cualquier extravagancia de él he's capable of doing some outrageous o very strange things
    2 (cualidad) extravagance
    su extravagancia en el vestir the outlandish o extravagant o outrageous way he dresses
    * * *

    extravagancia sustantivo femenino ( acto) outrageous thing (to do);
    ( cualidad) extravagance
    extravagancia sustantivo femenino extravagance
    ' extravagancia' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    chifladura
    - decir
    - humorada
    English:
    extravagance
    * * *
    1. [excentricidad] eccentricity
    2. [rareza] outlandishness
    * * *
    f eccentric behavior o Br
    behaviour;
    una de sus extravagancias one of his eccentricities
    * * *
    : extravagance, outlandishness, flamboyance

    Spanish-English dictionary > extravagancia

  • 16 orientación

    f.
    1 orientation, guidance, pointing, positioning.
    2 direction, bearing.
    3 direction finding, positioning.
    4 orientation, awareness of your environment.
    * * *
    1 (capacidad) sense of direction
    3 (dirección) orientation, direction; (tendencia) leanings plural, tendency
    4 (guía) guidance, orientation
    \
    orientación profesional career guidance, vocational guidance
    * * *
    noun f.
    * * *
    SF
    1) [de casa] aspect; [de habitación] position, orientation; (=dirección) direction
    2) (=guía) guidance, orientation
    3) (Dep) orienteering
    * * *
    1) (de habitación, edificio) aspect (frml)

    ¿cuál es la orientación de la casa? — which way does the house face?

    la orientación de la antena — the way the antenna (AmE) o (BrE) aerial is pointing

    2) (enfoque, dirección) orientation
    3) ( guía) guidance, direction; ( acción de guiar) orientation
    4) ( en un lugar) bearings (pl)
    * * *
    = orientation, slant, advice, outlook, orienteering, wayfinding, bearing, targeting, centredness, bent of mind.
    Ex. A summary at the end of a document is intended to complete the orientation of the reader, and to identify the significant ideas for the reader to remember.
    Ex. The 7th edition of CC is due to appear in 1971, and Ranganathan has given an extensive preview in an article in Library Science with a slant to documentation, cited at the end of this chapter.
    Ex. A large part of the work of information and advice has been the interpretation of people's eligibility for welfare benefits and other social services.
    Ex. In their first review article of children's reference books in 1982, the School Library Journal's Review Committe for children's reference books presents a bleak outlook.
    Ex. There are certain types of subject matter better suited to the nonbook format for which no subject heading exists, such as kits designed to develop orienteering.
    Ex. The author identifies the architectural barriers in library buildings facing disabled users with particular reference to wayfinding and the provision of suitable signage.
    Ex. When the real reading starts the mind, as a result of this skim, already has its bearings and so works more effectively.
    Ex. An analysis of customers in terms of benefits can inform effective segmentation, which in turn can lead to more efficient targeting of resources.
    Ex. The principles of learner centredness and constructivism provided the bases for the design of synchronous activities such as student moderated seminars in this study.
    Ex. Only when students have a scientific bent of mind, will a community and a country grow.
    ----
    * cambiar de orientación = reposition [re-position].
    * cambio de orientación = paradigm change, paradigm shift.
    * centro de orientación = referral centre.
    * con una orientación profesional = career-focused.
    * con una orientación social = socially-oriented.
    * con una orientación temática específica = subject-oriented.
    * de orientación = directional.
    * desorientación = disorientation.
    * orientación académica = educational guidance.
    * orientación a la lectura = readers' guidance.
    * orientación bibliográfica = bibliographic instruction (BI).
    * orientación hacia el hombre = human-centredness [human-centeredness, -USA].
    * orientación profesional = careers guidance, vocational guidance, career guidance, career education, career planning, careers education, career information.
    * orientación sexual = sexual orientation.
    * orientación sobre salidas profesionales = career guidance.
    * programa de orientación = orientation programme.
    * programa de orientación bibliográfica = bibliographic instruction program(me).
    * servicio de orientación = referral service, advisory service.
    * servicio de orientación al lector = readers' advisory service point, readers' advisory service.
    * * *
    1) (de habitación, edificio) aspect (frml)

    ¿cuál es la orientación de la casa? — which way does the house face?

    la orientación de la antena — the way the antenna (AmE) o (BrE) aerial is pointing

    2) (enfoque, dirección) orientation
    3) ( guía) guidance, direction; ( acción de guiar) orientation
    4) ( en un lugar) bearings (pl)
    * * *
    = orientation, slant, advice, outlook, orienteering, wayfinding, bearing, targeting, centredness, bent of mind.

    Ex: A summary at the end of a document is intended to complete the orientation of the reader, and to identify the significant ideas for the reader to remember.

    Ex: The 7th edition of CC is due to appear in 1971, and Ranganathan has given an extensive preview in an article in Library Science with a slant to documentation, cited at the end of this chapter.
    Ex: A large part of the work of information and advice has been the interpretation of people's eligibility for welfare benefits and other social services.
    Ex: In their first review article of children's reference books in 1982, the School Library Journal's Review Committe for children's reference books presents a bleak outlook.
    Ex: There are certain types of subject matter better suited to the nonbook format for which no subject heading exists, such as kits designed to develop orienteering.
    Ex: The author identifies the architectural barriers in library buildings facing disabled users with particular reference to wayfinding and the provision of suitable signage.
    Ex: When the real reading starts the mind, as a result of this skim, already has its bearings and so works more effectively.
    Ex: An analysis of customers in terms of benefits can inform effective segmentation, which in turn can lead to more efficient targeting of resources.
    Ex: The principles of learner centredness and constructivism provided the bases for the design of synchronous activities such as student moderated seminars in this study.
    Ex: Only when students have a scientific bent of mind, will a community and a country grow.
    * cambiar de orientación = reposition [re-position].
    * cambio de orientación = paradigm change, paradigm shift.
    * centro de orientación = referral centre.
    * con una orientación profesional = career-focused.
    * con una orientación social = socially-oriented.
    * con una orientación temática específica = subject-oriented.
    * de orientación = directional.
    * desorientación = disorientation.
    * orientación académica = educational guidance.
    * orientación a la lectura = readers' guidance.
    * orientación bibliográfica = bibliographic instruction (BI).
    * orientación hacia el hombre = human-centredness [human-centeredness, -USA].
    * orientación profesional = careers guidance, vocational guidance, career guidance, career education, career planning, careers education, career information.
    * orientación sexual = sexual orientation.
    * orientación sobre salidas profesionales = career guidance.
    * programa de orientación = orientation programme.
    * programa de orientación bibliográfica = bibliographic instruction program(me).
    * servicio de orientación = referral service, advisory service.
    * servicio de orientación al lector = readers' advisory service point, readers' advisory service.

    * * *
    A (de una habitación, un edificio) aspect ( frml)
    ¿cuál es la orientación de la casa? which way does the house face?
    la orientación de la antena the way the antenna is pointing
    la orientación de las placas solares the way o direction the solar panels are facing
    B
    1 (enfoque, dirección) orientation
    le dio una orientación práctica al curso he gave the course a practical bias, he oriented o ( BrE) orientated the course along practical lines
    la nueva orientación del partido the party's new direction
    2 (inclinación) leaning
    C (en un lugar) bearings (pl)
    perdí la orientación I lost my bearings
    sentido2 (↑ sentido (2))
    D
    1 (guía, consejo) guidance, direction
    2 (acción de guiar) orientation
    Compuestos:
    ● orientación profesional or (CS) vocacional
    (para colegiales, estudiantes) vocational guidance, careers advice; (para desempleados) career guidance o advice
    sexual orientation
    discriminar sobre la base de la orientación sexual to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
    * * *

     

    orientación sustantivo femenino
    a) (de habitación, edificio) aspect (frml);

    ◊ ¿cuál es la orientación de la casa? which way does the house face?;

    la orientación de la antena the way the antenna (AmE) o (BrE) aerial is pointing
    b) (enfoque, dirección) orientation


    ( acción de guiar) orientation;


    ( para desempleados) career guidance o advice

    orientación sustantivo femenino
    1 (en el espacio) orientation, direction: perdí la orientación, I lost my bearings
    2 (en el conocimiento) guidance
    gabinete de orientación psicológica, psychological guidance office
    3 (ideología, tendencia) direction
    ' orientación' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    COU
    - guía
    - curso
    English:
    A-level
    - exposure
    - face
    - guidance
    - marriage guidance
    - orientation
    - sense
    - vocational
    - aspect
    - counseling
    - direction
    - orienteering
    * * *
    1. [dirección] [acción] guiding;
    [rumbo] direction;
    sentido de la orientación sense of direction
    2. [posicionamiento] [acción] positioning;
    [lugar] position; [de edificio] aspect;
    una casa con orientación al oeste a house that faces west;
    hay que ajustar la orientación del sensor the position o angle of the sensor needs adjusting;
    ¿cuál tiene que ser la orientación de la antena? which way should the aerial be pointing?
    Informát orientación horizontal horizontal o landscape orientation; Informát orientación vertical vertical o portrait orientation
    3. [enfoque] orientation;
    le dieron una orientación práctica al curso the course had a practical bias o slant
    4. [información] guidance, advice;
    algunas orientaciones some guidance
    orientación pedagógica = guidance on courses to be followed;
    orientación profesional careers advice o guidance, career counselling;
    CSur orientación vocacional careers advice
    5. [tendencia] tendency, leaning;
    un partido con una orientación liberal a party with liberal leanings o tendencies
    orientación sexual sexual orientation
    6. [deporte de aventura] orienteering
    * * *
    f
    1 orientation
    2 ( ayuda) guidance
    3
    :
    sentido de la orientación sense of direction
    * * *
    1) : orientation
    2) dirección: direction, course
    3) guía: guidance, direction
    * * *
    orientación n aspect
    tener orientación a/hacia to face
    orientación profesional vocational guidance / careers advice

    Spanish-English dictionary > orientación

  • 17 मनस् _manas

    मनस् n. [मन्यते$नेन मन् करणे असुन्]
    1 The mind, heart, understanding, perception, intelligence; as in सुमनस्, दुमर्नस् &c.
    -2 (In phil.) The mind or internal organ of perception and cognition, the instrument by which objects of sense affect the soul; (in Nyāya phil. मनस् is regarded as a Dravya or substance, and is distinct from आत्मन् or the soul); तदेव सुखदुःखाद्युपलब्धि- साधनमिन्द्रियं प्रतिजीवं भिन्नमणु नित्यं च Tarka K.
    -3 Con- science, the faculty of discrimination or judgment.
    -4 Thought, idea, fancy, imagination, conception; पश्यन्न- दूरान्मनसाप्यधृष्यम् Ku.3.51; R.2.27; कायेन वाचा मनसापि शश्वत् 5.5; मनसापि न विप्रियं मया (कृतपूर्वम्) 8.52.
    -5 Design, purpose, intention.
    -6 Will, wish, desire, inclination; in this sense मनस् is frequently used with the infinitive form with the final म् dropped, and forms adjectives; अयं जनः प्रष्टुमनास्तपोधने Ku.5.4; cf. काम.
    -7 Reflection (ध्यान); मनसा जपैः प्रणतिभिः प्रयतः समुपेयिवानधिपतिं स दिवः Ki.6.22.
    -8 Disposition, temper, mood.
    -9 Spirit, energy, mettle; मनोवीर्यवरोत्सिक्तमसृण्यमकुतोभयम् Bhag.3. 17.22.
    -1 N. of the lake called Mānasa.
    -11 Breath or living soul.
    -12 Desire, longing after. (मनसा गम् &c. to think of, contemplate, remember; जगाम मनसा रामं धर्मज्ञो धर्मकाङ्क्षया Rām.2.82.9; (अगमत्) मनसा कार्यसंसिद्धौ त्वरादिगुणरंहसा Ku.2.63; मनः कृ to fix the mind upon, direct the thoughts towards, with dat. or loc.; मनो बन्ध् to fix the heart or affection upon; (अभिलाषे) मनो बबन्धान्यरसान् विलङ्ध्य सा R.3.4; मनः समाधा to collect oneself; मनसि उद्भू to cross the mind; मनसि कृ to think, to bear in mind; to resolve, determine, think of.) N. B. In comp. मनस् is changed to मनो before अ and soft consonants, as मनो$नुग, मनोज्ञ, मनोहर &c.).
    -Comp. -अधिनाथः a lover, husband.
    -अनवस्थानम् inattention.
    -अनुग a. suiting the mind, agreeable; ततस्तदग्ऱ्यं वचनं मनोनुगं समस्तमाज्ञाय ततो हि हेतुमत् Mb.12.167.49; Rām.7.72.18.
    -अप- हारिन् a. captivating the heart.
    -अभिनिवेशः close application of mind, firmness of purpose,
    -अभिराम a. pleasing the mind, gratifying to the heart; मनोभिरामाः (केकाः) R.1.39.
    -अभिलाषः the desire or longing of the heart.
    -आप a. gaining the heart, attractive, pleasing.
    -कान्त a. (मनस्कान्त or मनःकान्त) dear to the mind, pleasant, agreeable.
    -कारः perfect perception, full consciousness (of pleasure or pain), mental concen- tration, resolution; भवन्मनस्कारलवोद्गमेन क्रमेलकानां निलयः पुरेव N.14.84. (cf. मनसः ऐकाग्ऱ्यकरणं मनस्कारः Nārayaṇa com. on N.) दिदृक्षादत्तदृष्टीनां मनस्कारमनीषयोः । सप्रीतिरससन्तोषं दिशन्तौ देहकान्तितः ॥ Yādavābhyudaya 1.9.
    -क्षेपः (मनःक्षेपः) distraction of the mind, mental confusion.
    -गत a.
    1 existing or passing in the mind, concealed in the breast, internal, inward, secret; नेयं न वक्ष्यति मनोगतमाधिहेतुम् Ś.3. 11.
    -2 affecting the mind, desired.
    (-तम्) 1 a wish, desire; मनोगतं सा न शशाक शंसितुम् Ku.5.51.
    -2 an idea, thought, notion, opinion.
    -गतिः f. desire of the heart.
    -गवी wish, desire.
    -गुप्त a. hidden in the mind, thought secretly. (
    -प्ता) red arsenic.
    -ग्रहणम् captivating the mind.
    -ग्रहिन् a. captivating or fascinating the mind.
    -ग्राह्य a. to be grasped by the mind.
    -ह्यम् the plea- sures of sense; यो वृणीते मनोग्राह्यमसत्त्वात् कुमनीष्यसौ Bhāg.1. 48.11.
    -ग्लानिः depression of mind.
    -ज, -जन्मन् a. mindborn. (-m.) the god of love.
    -जल्पः imagination.
    -जव a.
    1 quick or swift as thought; मनोजवं मारुततुल्यवेगम् Rāma-rakṣā Stotra 33.
    -2 quick in thought or concep- tion.
    -3 fatherly, paternal.
    - जवस a. resembling a father, fatherly.
    -जवा 1 N. of one of the tongues of Agni.
    -2 N. of one of the शक्तिs of Durgā 'काली कराली च मनोजवा च' Śruti.
    -जात a. mind-born, arisen or produced in the mind.
    -जिघ्र a. scenting out, i. e. guessing the thoughts.
    -ज्ञ a. pleasing, lovely, agreeable, beautiful, charming; इयमधिकमनोज्ञा वल्कलेनापि तन्वी Ś.1.2; R.3.7; 6.1. (
    -ज्ञः) N. of a Gandharva.
    (-ज्ञा) 1 red arsenic.
    -2 an intoxicating drink.
    -3 a princess.
    -तापः, -पीडा 1 mental pain or agony, anguish.
    -तालः the lion of Durgā.
    -तुष्टिः f. satisfaction of the mind.
    -तोका an epithet of Durgā.
    -दण्डः complete control over the mind or thoughts; Ms.12.1; cf. त्रिदण्डिन्.
    -दत्त a. devoted in thought, mentally dedicated.
    -दाहः, -दुःखम् mental distress or torment.
    -दाहिन् the god of love.
    -दुष्ट a. depraved in mind; रजसा स्त्री मनोदुष्टा संन्यासेन द्विजोत्तम (शुद्ध्यति) Ms.5.18.
    -धारणम् conciliating the favour of.
    -नाशः loss of the mind or understanding, demented- ness.
    -नीत a. approved, chosen.
    -पतिः (
    -मनःपतिः) an epithet of Viṣṇu.
    -पर्यायः (with Jainas) N. of the last but one stage in the perception of truth.
    -पूत a.
    (मनःपूत) 1 considered pure by the mind, approved by one's conscience; मनःपूतं समाचरेत् Ms.6.46.
    -2 of a pure mind, conscientious.
    -प्रणीत a. (
    मनःप्रणीत) agreeable or pleasing to the mind.
    -प्रसादः (मनः- प्रसादः) composure of mind, mental calm.
    -प्रिय a. dear to the heart.
    -यः cinammon (Mar. दालचिनी).
    -प्रीतिः f. (
    मनःप्रीतिः) mental satisfaction, joy, delight.
    -भव a. mind-born, created by fancy; दृश्यमाना विनार्थेन न दृश्यन्ते मनोभवाः Bhāg.
    -भवः, -भूः 1 the god of love, Cupid; रे रे मनो मम मनोभवशासनस्य पादाम्बुजद्वयमनारतमानमन्तम् Bv.4.32; Ku.3.27; R.7.22; श्यामा शुशुभे शशिना तया मनोभूः Kalāvilāsa.
    -2 love, passion, lust; अत्यारूढो हि नारीणामकालज्ञो मनोभवः R.12.33.
    -मथनः the god of love.
    -मय see separately.
    -यायिन् a.
    1 going at will or pleasure.
    -2 swift, quick as thought; उत्पत्य खं दशग्रीवो मनोयायी शितास्त्रभृत् Bk.5.3.
    -3 keen desire; अहं हि तस्याद्य मनोभवेन संपीडिता तद्गतसर्वभावा Rām.5.32.12.
    -योगः close application of the mind, close attention.
    -योनिः the god of love.
    -रञ्जनम् 1 pleasing the mind.
    -2 pleasantness.
    -रथः 1 'the car of the mind', a wish, desire; अवतरतः सिद्धिपथं शब्दः स्वमनोरथस्येव M.1.22; मनोरथानामगतिर्न विद्यते Ku.5.64; R.2.72;12.59; उत्पद्यन्ते विलीयन्ते दरिद्राणां मनोरथाः Udb.; आशा नाम नदी मनोरथजला Bh.3.45.
    -2 a desired object; मनोरथाय नाशंसे Ś.7.13.
    -3 (in dramas) a hint, a wish expressed indirectly or covertly. ˚तृतीया N. of the third day in the bright half of Chaitra. ˚दायक a. fulfilling one's expectations. (-कः) N. of a Kalpa-taru. ˚द्रुमः the god of love. ˚बन्धः cherishing or entertaining of desire. ˚बन्धुः the friend of (who satisfies) desires; तस्या भवानपि मनोरथबन्धबन्धुः Māl.1.34. ˚सिद्धिः f. fulfilment of one's desires. ˚सृष्टिः f. a creation of the fancy, a castle in the air.
    -रम a. attractive, pleasing, agreeable, lovely, beautiful; अरुण- नखमनोरमासु तस्याः (अङ्गुलीषु) Ś.6.11; पुरस्ताद्विमले पात्रे सुविस्तीर्णे मनोरमे Suśruta.
    (-मा) 1 a lovely woman.
    -2 a kind of pigment.
    -रागः affection, passion (of the heart).
    -राज्यम् 'kingdom of the fancy', a castle in the air; मनोराज्यविजृम्भणमेतत् 'this is building castles in the air'.
    -रुज् f. pain or grief of the heart.
    -लयः loss of consciousness.
    -लौल्यम् freak, caprice.
    -वल्लभा a beloved woman.
    -वहा N. of a particular artery; ('अश्वत्थपत्रनाडीव द्विसप्ततिशताधिका । नाडी मनोवहेत्युक्तं योगशास्त्र- विशारदैः'); मध्ये च हृदयस्यैका शिरा तत्र मनोवहा । शुकं संकल्पजं नॄणां सर्वगात्रैर्विमुञ्चति ॥ Mb.12.214.19.
    -वाक्कर्मन् n. pl. thoughts, words and deeds.
    -वाञ्छा, -वाञ्छितम् a wish of the heart, a desire,
    -विकारः, -विकृतिः f. emotion of the mind.
    -विनयनम् mental discipline.
    -विरुद्ध a.
    1 incomprehensible.
    -2 against the dictates of mind or conscience.
    -वृत्तिः f.
    1 working of the mind, volition.
    -2 disposition, temper.
    -वेगः quickness of thought.
    -व्यथा mental pain or anguish.
    -शल्य a. rankling in the mind; (बाहुः) कुबेरस्य मनःशल्यं शंसतीव पराभवम् Ku.2.22.
    -शिलः, -ला red arsenic; मनःशिला- विच्छुरिता निषेदुः Ku.1.55; R.12.8; टङ्कैर्मनःशिलगुहैरवदीर्य- माणा Mk.; गन्धाश्मानं मनःशिलाम् Śiva B.3.19; मनःशिला- पङ्कलिखितेन च विद्योतितललाटपट्टाम् K.
    -शीघ्र a. quick as thought.
    -संकल्पः desire of the heart.
    -संगः attach- ment of the mind (to anything).
    -संचेतनाहारः (with Buddhists) one of the four kinds of food (in a mate- rial and spiritual senses)
    -संतापः anguish of the mind.
    -समृद्धिः heart's content; Bhāg.
    -संवरः coercion of mind.
    -सुख a. agreeable to the mind.
    -स्थ a. being in the heart, mental.
    -स्थैर्यम् firmness of mind.
    -हत a. disappointed.
    -हर a. pleasing, charming, attractive, fascinating, lovely; अव्याजमनोहरं वपुः Ś.1.18; Ku.3.39; R.3.32. (
    -रः) a kind of jasmine. (
    -रम्) gold.
    -हर्तृ, -हारिन् a. heart-stealing, captivating, agreeable, plea- sing; हितं मनोहारि च दुर्लभं वचः Ki.1.4; गाङ्गं वारि मनोहारि मुरारिचरणच्युतम् Gaṅgāṣṭaka by Vālmīki 7.
    -हारी an unchaste or unfaithful woman.
    -ह्लादः gladness of heart.
    -ह्वा red arsenic; मनःशिला मनोगुप्ता मनोह्वा नागजिह्विका Bhāva. P.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > मनस् _manas

  • 18 अङ्गम् _aṅgam

    अङ्गम् [अम् गत्यादौ बा˚ -गन्; according to Nir. अङ्ग, अङ्ग- नात् अञ्चनात् वा]
    1 The body.
    -2 A limb or member of the body; शेषाङ्गनिर्माणविधौ विधातुः Ku.1.33; क्लेशस्याङ्गमदत्वा Pt.5. 32 without undergoing troubles; इति स्वप्नोपमान्मत्वा कामान्मा गास्तदङ्गताम् । Ki.11.34 do not be influenced or swayed by them (do not be subject to them)
    -3 (a.) A division or department (of anything), a part or portion, as of a whole; as सप्ताङ्गम् राज्यम्, चतुरङ्गम् बलम्, चतुःषष्ट्ष्ट्यङ्गम् ज्योतिः- शास्त्रम् see the words; गीताङ्गानाम् Pt.5.56; यज्ञश्चेत्प्रतिरुद्धःस्या- देकेनाङ्गेन यज्वनः Ms.11.11. (Hence) (b.) A supple- mentary or auxiliary portion, supplement; षडङ्ग or साङ्ग वेदः A peculiar use of the word अङ्ग in masculine gender may here be noted वेदांश्चैव तु वेदाङ्गान् वेदान्तानि तथा स्मृतीः । अधीत्य ब्राह्मणः पूर्वं शक्तितो$न्यांश्च संपठेत् Bṛhadyogiyājñaval- kya Smṛiti 12.34. (c.) A constituent part, essential requisite or component; सर्वैर्बलाङ्गैः R.7.59; तदङ्गमग्ऱ्यं मघवन् महाक्रतो R.3.46. (d.) An attributive or secondary part; secondary, auxiliary or dependent member (serving to help the principal one) (opp. प्रधान or अङ्गिन्); अङ्गी रौद्र- रसस्तत्र सर्वे$ङ्गानि रसाः पुनः S. D.517; अत्र स्वभावोक्तिरुत्प्रेक्षाङ्गम् Malli. on Ki 8.26. (e.) An auxiliary means or expe- dient (प्रधानोपयोगी उपायः or उपकरणम्); सर्वकार्यशरीरेषु मुक्त्वा- ङ्गस्कन्धपञ्चकम् । मन्त्रो योध इवाधीर सर्वाङ्गैः संवृतैरपि ॥ Śi.2.28-29; See अङ्गाङ्गि, पञ्चाङ्ग also ( the angas of the several sciences or departments of knowledge will be given under those words).
    -4 (Gram.) A name for the base of a word; यस्मात्प्रत्ययविधिस्तदादिप्रत्यये अङ्गम् P.I.4.13; यः प्रत्ययो यस्मात्क्रियते तदादिशब्दस्वरूपं तस्मिन्प्रत्यये परे अङ्गसंज्ञं स्यात् Sk. The अङ्ग terminations are those of the nominative, and accusative singular and dual.
    -5 (Drama) (a.) One of the sub-divisions of the five joints or sandhis in dramas; the मुख has 12, प्रतिमुख 13, गर्भ 12, विमर्ष 13 and उपसंहार 14, the total number of the angas being thus 64; for details see the words. (b.) The whole body of subordinate characters.
    -6 (astr.) A name for the position of stars (लग्न), See अङ्गाधीश.
    -7 A symbolical expression for the number six (derived from the six Vedāngas).
    -8 The mind; हिरण्यगर्भाङ्गभुवं मुनिं हरिः Śi.1.1, See अङ्गज also.
    -9 N. of the chief sacred texts of the jainas.
    -ङ्गः (pl.) N. of a country and the people inhabiting it, the country about the modern Bhāgalpur in Bengal. [It lay on the south of Kauśikī Kachchha and on the right bank of the Ganges. Its capital was Champā, sometimes called Aṅgapurī Lomapādapurī, Karṇapurī or Mālinī. According to Daṇḍin (अङ्गेषु गङ्गातटे बहिश्चम्पायाः) and Hiouen Thsang it stood on the Ganges about 24 miles west of a rocky island. General Cunningham has shown that this description applies to the hill opposite Pātharghāṭā, that it is 24 miles east of Bhāgalpur, and that there are villages called Champanagar and Champapura adjoininng the last. According to Sanskrit poets the country of the Aṅgas lay to the east of Girivraja, the capital of Magadha and to the north- east or south-east of Mithilā. The country was in ancient times ruled by Karṇa] cf. अङ्गं गात्रा- न्तिकोपाय प्रतीकेष्वप्रधानके । देशभेदे तु पुंसि स्यात्...॥ Nm. -a.
    1 Contiguous.
    -2 Having members or divisions.
    -Comp. -अङ्गि, [
    अङ्गीभावः -अङगस्य अङ्गिनो भावः] the relation of a limb to the body, of the subordinate to the principal, or of that which is helped or fed to the helper or feeder (गौणमुख्यभावः, उपकार्येपकारकभावश्च); e. g. प्रयाज and other rites are to दर्श as its angas, while दर्श is to them the aṅgi; अङ्गाङ्गिभावमज्ञात्वा कथं सामर्थ्यनिर्णयः । पश्य टिट्टिभमात्रेण समुद्रो व्याकुलीकृतः ॥ H.2.138; अत्र वाक्ये समास- गतयोरुपमयोः साध्यसाधनभावात् ˚वेन सम्बन्धः Malli. on Ki.6.2; अविश्रान्तिजुषामात्मन्यङ्गाङ्गित्वं तु संकरः K.P.1. (अनुग्राह्यानुग्राह- कत्वम्).
    -अधिपः, -अधीशः 1 lord of the Aṅgas, N. of Karṇa (cf. ˚राजः, ˚पतिः, ˚ईश्वरः, ˚अधीश्वरः).
    -2 'lord of a लग्न', the planet presiding over it; (अङ्गाधिपे बलिनि सर्वविभूतिसम्पत्; अङ्गाधीशः स्वगेहे बुधगुरुकविभिः संयुतो वीक्षितो वा Jyotiṣa).
    -अपूर्वम् effect of a secondary sacrificial act.
    -कर्मन् n.
    -क्रिया 1 besmearing the body with fragrant cosmetics, rubbing it &c. Dk.39.
    -2 a supplementary sacrificial act.
    -क्रमः the order of the performance with reference to the अङ्गs. The rule in this connection is that the अङ्गक्रम must conform to the मुख्यक्रम. cf. MS. 5.1.14.
    -ग्रहः spasm; seizure of the body with some illness.
    -ज-जात a. [अङ्गात् जायते जन्-ड]
    1 produced from or on the body, being in or on the body, bodily; ˚जं रजः, ˚जाः अलङ्काराः &c.
    -2 produced by a supple- mentary rite.
    -3 beautiful, ornamental. (
    -जः)
    -जनुस् also
    1 a son.
    -2 hair of the body (n. also); तवोत्तरीयं करिचर्म साङ्गजम् Ki.18.32.
    -3 love, cupid (अङ्गं मनः तस्मा- ज्जातः); intoxicating passion; अङ्गजरागदीपनात् Dk.161.
    -4 drunkenness, intoxication.
    -5 a disease. (
    -जा) a daugh- ter. (
    -जम्) blood, अङ्गजं रुधिरे$नङ्गे केशे पुत्रे मदे पुमान् । नागरे नखरे$पि स्यात्... । Nm.
    -ज्वरः [अङ्गमङ्गम् अधिकृत्य ज्वरः] the disease called राजयक्ष्मा, a sort of consumption.
    -दूष- णम् 1 the defects of the limbs; the penalties of a defec- tive construction; Māna.
    -2 name of the 79th chapter.
    -द्वीपः one of the six minor Dvīpas.
    -न्यासः [अङ्गेषु मन्त्र- भेदस्य न्यासः] touching the limbs of the body with the hand accompanied by appropriate Mantras.
    -पालिः f. [अङ्गं पाल्यते सम्बध्यते$त्र, अङ्ग-पाल्-इ] an embrace (probably a corruption of अङ्कपालि).
    -पालिका = अङ्कपालि q. v.
    -प्रत्यङ्गम् [समा. द्वन्द्व] every limb, large and small; ˚गानि पाणिना स्पृष्ट्वा K.167,72.
    -प्रायश्चित्तम् [अङ्गस्य शुद्ध्यर्थं प्राय- श्चित्तम्] expiation of bodily impurity, such as that caused by the death of a relative, consisting in making pre- sents (पञ्चसूनाजन्यदुरितक्षयार्थं कार्यं दानरूपं प्रायश्चित्तम् Tv.).
    -भूः a. [अङ्गात् मनसो वा भवति; भू-क्विप्] born from the body or mind.
    (-भूः) 1 a son.
    -2 Cupid.
    -3 [अङ्गानाम् अङ्गमन्त्राणां भूः स्थानम्] one who has touched and purified, and then restrained, his limbs by repeating the Man- tras pertaining to those limbs; ब्रह्माङ्गभूर्ब्रह्मणि योजितात्मा Ku.3.15 (सद्योजातादिमन्त्राणाम् अङ्गानां हृदयादिमन्त्राणां भूः स्थानं, कृतमन्त्रन्यासः Malli.).
    -भङ्गः 1 palsy or paralysis of limbs; ˚विकल इव भूत्वा स्थास्यामि Ś.2.
    -2 twisting or stretching out of the limbs (as is done by a man just after he rises from sleep); साङ्गभङ्गमुत्थाय Vb.; जृम्भितैः साङ्गभङ्गैः Mu.3.21, K.85.
    -3 The middle part of the anus and testicles.
    -मन्त्रः N. of a Mantra.
    -मर्दः [अङ्ग मर्दयति; मृद्-णिच्]
    1 one who shampoos his master's body.
    -2 [भावे घञ्] act of shampooing; so ˚मर्दका or ˚मर्दिन्, मृद्- णिच् ण्वुल् or णिनि) one who shampoos.
    -मर्षः [ष. त.] rheumatism; ˚प्रशमनम् the curing of this disease. ˚मेजयत्वम् subtle throbbing of the body; Pātañjala 1.31.
    -यज्ञः, -यागः [अङ्गीभूतः यज्ञः] a subordinate sacrificial act which is of 5 sorts; समिधो यजति, तनूनपातं यजति, इडो यजति, बर्हिर्यजति, स्वाहाकारं यजति इति पञ्चविधाः । एतेषां सकृदनुष्ठा- नेनैव तन्त्रन्यायेन प्रधानयागानामाग्नेयादीनामुपकारितेति मीमांसा Tv.
    -रक्तः, -क्तम् [अङ्गे अवयवे रक्तः] N. of a plant गुडारोचनी found in काम्पिल्य country and having red powder (रक्ताङ्गलोचनी).
    -रक्षकः [अङ्गं रक्षति; रक्ष्-ण्वुल्] a body- guard, personal attendant Pt.3.
    -रक्षणी [अङ्ग रक्ष्यते अनया] a coat of mail, or a garment. (
    -णम्) protection of person.
    -रागः [अङ्गं रज्यते अनेन करणे घञ्]
    1 a scented cosmetic, application of perfumed unguents to the body, fragrant unguent; पुष्पगन्धेन अङ्गरागेण R.12.27, 6.6, स्तनाङ्गरागात् Ku.5.11.
    -2 [भावे ल्युट्] act of anointing the body with unguents.
    -रुहम् [अङ्गे रोहति; रुह्-क स. त. P.III.9.135.] hair; मम वर्णो मणिनिभो मृदून्य- ङ्गरुहाणि च Rām.6.48.12. विहङ्गराजाङ्गरुहैरिवायतैः Śi.1.7.
    -लिपिः f. written character of the Aṅgas.
    -लेपः [अङ्गं लिप्यते अनेन; लिप्-करणे घञ्]
    1 a scented cosmetic.
    -2 [भावे घञ्] act of anointing.
    -लोड्यः (लोड ण्यत्) a kind of grass, ginger or its root, Amomum Zingiber.
    -वस्त्रोत्था f. A louse.
    -विकल a. [तृ. त.]
    1 maimed, paralysed.
    -2 fainting, swooning.
    -विकृतिः f.
    1 change 2of bodily appearance; collapse.
    -2 [अङ्गस्य विकृतिश्चालनादिर्यस्मात् प. ब.] an apoplectic fit, swooning, apoplexy (अपस्मार).
    -विकारः a bodily defect.
    -विक्षेपः 1 movement of the limbs; gesticulation.
    -2 a kind of dance.
    -विद्या [अङ्गरूपा व्याकरणादिशास्त्ररूपा विद्या ज्ञानसाधनम्]
    1 the science of grammar &c. contributing to knowledge.
    -2 the science of foretelling good or evil by the movements of limbs. Kau. A.1.12; N. of chapter 51 of Bṛhat Saṁhitā which gives full details of this science; न नक्षत्राङ्गविद्यया...भिक्षां लिप्सेत कर्हिचित् Ms.6.5.
    -विधिः [अङ्गस्य प्रधानोपकारिणः विधिः विधानम् [a subordinate or subsidiary act sub- servient to a knowledge of the principal one (प्रधान- विधिविधेयकर्मणो$ङ्गबोधकतया अङ्गविधिः).
    -वीरः chief or princi- pal hero.
    -वैकृतम् [अङ्गेन अङ्गचेष्टया वैकृतं हृदयभावो ज्ञाप्यते यत्र बहु.]
    1 a sign, gesture or expression of the face leading to a knowledge of internal thoughts (आकार)
    -2 a nod, wink.
    -3 changed bodily appearance.
    -वैगुण्यम् a defect or flaw in the performance of some subordinate or subsidiary act which may be expiated by thinking of Viṣṇu); श्राद्धादिपद्धतौ कर्मान्ते यत्किञ्चिदङ्गवैगुण्यं जातं तद्दोषप्रशमनाय विष्णुस्मरणमहं करिष्ये इत्यभिलापवाक्यम् Tv.).
    -संस्कारः, -संस्क्रिया [अङ्गं संस्क्रियते अनेन; कृ-करणे or भावे- घञ्)
    1 embellishment of person, personal decoration, doing whatever secures a fine personal appearance, such as bathing, rubbing the body, perfuming it with cosmetic &c.
    -2 [कर्त्रर्थे अण्] one who decorates or embellishes the person.
    -संहतिः f. compactness, symmetry; body; स्थेयसीं दधतमङ्गसंहतिम् Ki.13.5; or strength of the body.
    -संहिता The phonetic relation between consonants and vowels in the body of a word Ts. Prāt.
    -सङ्गः bodily contact, union; coition.
    -सुप्तिः f. Benumbing of the body.
    -सेवकः a personal attend- ant, body-guard.
    -स्कन्धः [कर्मधा.] a subdivision of a science.
    -स्पर्शः fitness or qualification for bodily con- tact or being touched by others.
    -हानिः f. 1. a defect or flaw in the performance of a secondary or subsidi- ary act (= ˚वैगुण्यम्); दैवाद् भ्रमात् प्रमादाच्चेदङ्गहानिः प्रजायते । स्मरणादेव तद्विष्णोः संपूर्णं स्यादिति श्रुतिः ॥
    -हारः [अङ्गं ह्रियते इतस्ततः चाल्यते यत्र, हृ-आधारे or भावे घञ्] gesticulation, movements of the limbs, a dance; अङ्गहारैस्तथैवान्या कोमलै- र्नृत्यशालिनी Rām.5.1.36. संसक्तैरगुरुवनेषु साङ्गहारम् Ki.7.37. Ku.7.91.
    -हारिः [अङ्गं ह्रियते$त्र; हृ-बा˚णि]
    1 gesticula- tion.
    -2 stage; dancing hall.
    -हीन a. [तृ. त.]
    1 muti- lated, deprived of some defective limb (अङ्गं हीनं यथो- चितप्रमाणात् अल्पं यस्य) according to Suśruta a man is so born, if the mother's दोहद has not been duly fulfilled (सा प्राप्तदौर्हृदा पुत्रं जनयेत गुणान्वितम् । अलब्धदौर्हृदा गर्भे लभेता- त्मनि वा भयम् ॥ येषु येष्विन्द्रियार्थेषु दौर्हृदे वै विमानना । जायते तत्सुतस्यार्तिस्तस्मिंस्तस्मिंस्तथेन्द्रिये ॥).

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > अङ्गम् _aṅgam

  • 19 Creativity

       Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)
       Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)
       There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)
       he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)
       he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)
       From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)
       Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)
       The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)
       In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)
       he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)
        11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder
       Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)
       New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)
       [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....
       Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)
       A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....
       Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity

  • 20 भावः _bhāvḥ

    भावः [भू-भावे घञ्]
    1 Being, existing, existence; नासतो विद्यते भावः Bg.2.16.
    -2 Becoming, occurring, taking place.
    -3 State, condition, state of being; लताभावेन परिणतमस्या रूपम् V.4; U.6.23; so कातरभावः, विवर्णभावः &c.
    -4 Manner, mode.
    -6 Rank, station, position, capacity; देवीभावं गमिता K. P.1; so प्रेष्यभावम्, किंकरभावम् &c.
    -6 (a) True condition or state, truth, reality; परं भावमजानन्तः Bg.7.24; इति मत्वा भजन्ते मां बुधा भावसम- न्विताः 1.8. (b) Sincerity, devotion; त्वयि मे भावनिबन्धना रतिः R.8.52;2.26.
    -7 Innate property, disposition, nature, temperament; स तस्य स्वो भावः प्रकृतिनियतत्वादकृतकः U.6.14.
    -8 Inclination or disposition of mind, idea, thought, opinion, supposition; हृदयनिहितभावा गूढमन्त्रप्रचाराः किमपि विगणयन्तो बुद्धिमन्तः सहन्ते Pt.3.43; Ms.8.25;4.65; निकृष्टोत्कृष्टयोर्भावं यास्तु गृह्णन्ति ताः स्त्रियः Bu. Ch.4.23.
    -9 Feeling, emotion, sentiment; एको भावः Pt.3.66; Ku.6. 95; निर्विकारात्मके चित्ते भावः प्रथमविक्रिया S. D. (In the dramatic science or in poetic compositions generally, Bhāvas are either स्थायिन् primary, or व्यभिचारिन् subordinate. The former are eight or nine, according as the Rasas are taken to be 8 or 9, each rasa having its own स्थायिभाव. The latter are thirty-three of thirty four in number, and serve to develop and strengthen the prevailing sentiment; for definition and enumera- tion of the several kinds, see R. G. first ānana, or K. P.4).
    -1 Love, affection; attachment; द्वन्द्वानि भावं क्रियया विवव्रुः Ku.3.35; कुमुद्वती भानुमतीव भावं (बबन्ध) R.6.36.
    -11 Purport, drift, gist, substance; इति भावः (often used by commentators); जनको$प्युत्स्मयन् राजा भावमस्या विशेषयन् । प्रतिजग्राह भावेन भावमस्या नृपोत्तम Mb.12,32.18.
    -12 Meaning, intention, sense, import; अन्योन्यभावचतुरेण सखीजनेन मुक्तास्तदा स्मितसुधामधुराः कटाक्षाः Māl.1.25.
    -13 Resolution, determination.
    -14 The heart, soul, mind; तयोर्विवृतभावत्वात् Māl.1.12; भावसंशुद्धिरित्येतत् तपो मानसमुच्यते Bg.17.16; स्व एव भावे विनिगृह्य मन्मथम् Bu. Ch.4.11.
    -15 Any existing thing, an object, a thing, substance; पश्यन्ती विविधान् भावान् Rām.2.94.18; जगति जयिनस्ते ते भावा नवेन्दुकलादयः Māl.1.17,36; R.3.41; U.3.32.
    -16 A being, living creature.
    -17 Abstract medita- tion, contemplation (= भावना q. v.).
    -18 Conduct, movement.
    -19 (a) Gesture, behaviour; अहिंसा समता... भवन्ति भावा भूतानाम् Bg.1.5. (b) Amorous gesture or expression of sentiment; gesture of love; कामं प्रिया न सुलभा मनस्तु तद्भावदर्शनाश्वासि Ś.2.1.
    -2 Birth; तवाहं पूर्वके भावे पुत्रः परपुरंजय Rām.7.14.2.
    -21 The world, universe.
    -22 The womb.
    -23 Will; घोरैर्विव्यधतुर्बाणैः कृतभावावुभौ जये Rām.6.9.38.
    -24 Superhuman power; मिथो घ्नतं न पश्यन्ति भावैर्भावं पृथग्दृशः Bhāg.1.4.27.
    -25 Advice, instruction.
    -26 (In dramas) A learned or venerable man, worthy man, (a term of address); भाव अयमस्मि V.1; तां खलु भावेन तथैव सर्वे वर्ग्याः पाठिताः) Māl.1.
    -27 (In gram.) The sense of an abstract noun, abstract idea conveyed by a word; भावे क्तः.
    -28 A term for an impersonal passive or neuter verb.
    -29 (In astr.) An astronomical house.
    -3 A lunar mansion.
    -31 An organ of sense.
    -32 Welfare (कल्याण); भावमिच्छति सर्वस्य नाभावे कुरुते मनः Mb.5.36.16.
    -33 Protection; द्रोणस्याभावभावे तु प्रसक्तानां यथा$भवत् Mb.7.25.64.
    -34 Fate, destiny (प्रारब्ध); नातिप्रहीणरश्मिः स्यात्तथा भावविपर्यये Mb.5.77.14.
    -35 Consciousness of past perceptions (वासना); येभ्यः सृजति भूतानि काले भावप्रचोदितः । महाभूतानि पञ्चेति तान्याहुर्भूतचिन्तिकाः ॥ Mb.12.275.4.
    -36 Lordship (प्रभुत्व); ते$पि भावाय कल्पन्ते राजदण्डनिपीडिताः Rām.2.67. 32.
    -37 The six states (अवस्थाषट्क); A, Rām.1.7.31.
    -Comp. -अनुग a. not forced, natural. (
    -गा) a shadow.
    -अन्तरम् a different state.
    -अद्वैतम् 1 a natu- ral cause.
    -2 material cause (as thread of a cloth).
    -3 identity of conception, oneness of view.
    -अर्थः 1 the obvious meaning or import (of a word, phrase &c.).
    -2 the subject matter; सर्वेषामपि वस्तूनां भावार्थो भवति स्थितः Bhāg.1.14.57.
    -आकूतम् (secret) thoughts of the mind; हृदयनिहितं भावाकूतं वमद्भिरिवेक्षणैः Amaru.4.
    -आख्यः One of the two types of creation according to the Sāṅkhya philosophy; लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः Sāṅ. K.52.
    -आत्मक a. real, actual.
    -आभासः simulation of a feeling, a feigned or false emotion.
    -आलीना a shadow.
    - एकरस a. influenced solely by the sentiment of (sincere) love; ममात्र भावैकरसं मनः स्थितम् Ku.5.82.
    -कर्तृकः an impersonal verb; Kāśi. on P. II.3.54.
    -गतिः f. power to convey human feelings; भावगतिराकृतीनाम् Pratimā 3.
    -गम्भीरम् ind.
    1 heartily, from the bottom of the heart.
    -2 deeply, gravely.
    -गम्य a. conceived by the mind; ममत्सादृश्यं विरहतनु वा भावगम्यं लिखन्ती Me.87.
    -ग्राहिन् a.
    1 understanding the sense.
    -2 appreciating the sentiment.
    -ग्राह्य a. to be conceived with the heart; भावग्राह्यमनीडाख्यं भावाभावकरं शिवम् Śvet. Up.5.14.
    -चेष्टितम् amorous gesture.
    -जः 1 love.
    -2 the god of love.
    -ज्ञ, -विद् a. knowing the heart.
    -दर्शिन् a. see भालदर्शिन्.
    -निर्वृत्तिः the material creation (Sāṅ. phil.); न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः Sāṅ. K.52.
    -नेरिः a kind of dance.
    -बन्धन a. enchanting or fettering the heart, linking together the hearts; रथाङ्गनाम्नोरिव भावबन्धनं बभूव यत्प्रेम परस्पराश्रयम् R.3.24.
    -बोधक a. indicating or revealing any feeling.
    -मिश्रः a worthy person, a gentleman (used in dramas); प्रसीदन्तु भावमिश्राः Ś.6.
    -रूप a. real, actual.
    -वचनम् denoting an abstract idea, conveying the abstract notion of a verb.
    -वाचकम् an abstract noun.
    -विकारः a property of a being; षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्यायणिः । जायते$स्ति विपरिणमते वर्धते$पक्षीयते नश्यति ।
    -वृत्तः an epithet of Brahman.
    -शबलत्वम् a mixture of various emotions (भावानां बाध्यबाधकभावमापन्नानामुदासीनानां वा व्यामिश्रणम् R. G., vide examples given ad loc.).
    -शुद्धिः f. purity of mind, honesty, sincerity.
    -शून्य a. devoid of real love; उपचारविधिर्मनस्विनीनां न तु पूर्वाभ्यधिको$पि भावशून्यः M.3.3.
    -संधिः the union or co-existence of two emotions (भावसंधिरन्योन्यानभिभूतयोरन्योन्याभिभावनयोग्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यम् R. G., see the examples there given).
    -समाहित a. abstracted in mind, devout.
    -सर्गः the mental or intellectual creation; i. e. the creation of the faculties of the human mind and their affections (opp. भौतिकसर्ग or material creation).
    -स्थ a. attached; devoted (to one); न वेत्सि भावस्थमिमं कथं जनम् Ku.5.58.
    -स्थिर a. firmly rooted in the heart; Ś.5.2.
    -स्निग्ध a. affection- ately disposed, sincerely attached; भावस्निग्धैरुपकृतमपि द्वेष्यतां याति किंचित् Pt.1.285.
    -भावंगम a. charming, lovely.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > भावः _bhāvḥ

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